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Abstract 
 
Governments and private organisations are increasingly aware that vital information 
stored  in  their  databases  is  no  longer  safe  behind  perimeter  firewalls,  intrusion 
prevention  systems  and  other  edge  protections.  Databases  store  a  broad  range  of 
private  and  important  information,  making  them  a  prime  target  for  exploitation  by 
wrongdoers wishing to breach confidentiality, damage the integrity of the data or make 
it unavailable to its users. 
The intricate nature and the non-stoppable critical services running in databases makes 
forensic examination of database difficult and  challenges the forensics recovery and 
examination processes.  
The research presented in this thesis discusses the feasibility of developing an enhanced 
workflow that provides insight into the challenging complexities of examining and using 
database evidence. It lays the foundation for the development and establishment of 
standards in database forensic analysis and forensic case management. 
The major contribution of this research is a literature review that summarises the state-
of-the-art in database forensics. It argues for the need for more in-depth research in this 
field and highlights limited availability of forensic data.  To improve this, the research 
presents the design of a generic workflow  of database forensic examination. This is 
evaluated using a qualitative and case study based evaluation and highlights the various 
limitations and drawback of the workflow. 
In  summary,  the  research  in  this  thesis  proposes  a  system  that  allows  a  forensic 
examiner to focus on what is relevant to a case in a systematic way that can be proved 
in  court.  The  workflow also  acts  as  a  case  management  tool  by  aiding  the  forensic  
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examiner to apply established standards and procedures to identify best-case result by 
systematically, thoroughly and efficiently collecting and validating digital evidence.  
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1  Introduction 
1.1  Overview 
Databases run the world and touch our lives daily; when we surf the web, make a phone 
call, swipe our credit  card, use ATM, buy  from  a supermarket,  secure a passport  or 
driver’s license, book a flight or visit a doctor. Nowadays, computer applications and 
databases are geographically distributed and are available to suppliers, customers and 
business partners who undertake business over the web (Ball, 2010).  
However,  the  reliance  on  databases  over  time  has  made  users  highly  dependent  on 
network and information systems to complete essential operations. Whilst this technology 
has provided many benefits, it also has a number of vulnerabilities that has opened doors 
through which transgressors can target data and systems on which they depend. (Ottman, 
2010). 
Governments  and  private  organisations  according  to  Steven  King,  CTO  from  Data 
Intensity  are aware that their vital  information stored  on  databases  is  not  completely 
secure in terms of confidentiality, integrity and availability (Williams, 2007, p. 3) behind 
perimeter firewalls, intrusion prevention systems and other edge protections. The current 
database  topology  is  not  flexible  enough  to  differentiate  between  a  user  and  a 
transgressor  and  processes  all  transactions  by  any  user  with  a  valid  user  name  and 
password (Radcliff, 2009). 
According  to  Clifton  (2004),  associate  professor  of  computer  science  at  Purdue 
University database security is generally focused on access control and users are allowed 
certain types of access to data but privacy is a complex concept and structuring issues 
with database queries, along with complications with views and updates inhibit database 
administrators  from  enforcing  access  control  policies  inside  the  database  to  prevent  
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compromised  applications  through  SQL  injection  and  other  methods  (Clifton,  et  al., 
2004, p. 21).  
Databases store a broad range of private and important information making them a prime 
target  for  exploitation  by  wrongdoers  wishing  to  breach  confidentiality,  damage  the 
integrity of the data, or make it unavailable to its users (King, 2009; Casey, 2011, p. 4; 
Singhal, Gunestas, & Wijesekara, 2010, pp. 1-2). 
In a combined report published by the Verizon RISK team, U.S. Secret Service (USSS) 
and the Dutch National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU), the total number of database 
record  breaches  in  2009  was  approximately  over  285  million  records.  In  2010,  the 
numbers of data breaches were an estimated 761 million records and the statistics of 2011 
shows this figure to be a staggering 900 million compromised records (Verizon, 2009; 
2010 & 2011).  
Unfortunately,  cyber-crime  is  a  phenomenon  of  today`s  global  society,  and  the 
individuals involved in deviant and/or criminal behavior have embraced technology as a 
method for improving or extending their criminal tradecraft (Rogers, GoldMan, Mislan, 
& Wedge, 2006, p. 27). With the proliferation of technology, our notion of evidence and 
what constitutes potential sources of evidence are drastically changing and according to 
Boddington, Hobbs & Mann (2008) becoming more digital reliant. 
Database forensics is an emerging subdivision of cyber forensics that examines the digital 
or electronic evidence of database related incidents by combining the elements of law and 
computer  science  with  the  aid  of  forensics  expertise  and  specialist  forensics  tools 
(Suffern, 2010, p. 67). The entire process is systematically recorded and documented, and 
then  the  gathered  digital  evidence  is  admissible  in  the  court  of  law  (Fowler,  2009; 
Henrique, 2007; US-CERT, 2008; Nelson, Phillips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 2006).  
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The currently available frameworks and models, as described in Chapter 3, take a generic 
approach in dealing with computer related incidents and examine how unstructured data 
does not have the flexibility to apply the same principles to structured data in a database. 
Therefore, the time seems right for a common framework of reference, exclusively for 
database forensics.  
1.2  Aims 
The  purpose  of  this  research  is  to  look  at  the  feasibility  of  developing  an  enhanced 
workflow  for  database  forensic  examination  that  will  assist  forensics  examiners  to 
identify  and  investigate  database  related  incidents  in  a  systematic  way  that  will  be 
acceptable in the court of law (Fruhwirt, Huber , Mulazzani, & Weippl, 2010, p. 1028).  
This workflow will be evaluated using a qualitative and case study based evaluation and 
will highlight the various limitations and drawback of the design. 
This research will also aim to provide a greater understanding of the volatile and delicate 
nature of database forensic artifacts (Loshin, 2006, p. 24) to the legal fraternity and non-
technical user dealing with database transgressions. 
Finally  this  research  will  describes  how  forensic  analysis  is  undertaken  at  a  higher 
standard  by  establishing  policies  and  processes  for  defining  rules  and  reaching 
agreements that will be helpful to the various stakeholders, such as forensics analysts, 
database  administrators,  data  custodians  and  law  enforcement  officials,  to  establish 
forensic case management and rules. 
. 
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1.3  Structure of this Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is as follows: 
Chapter 2 is literature review, which introduces the concept of databases and discusses 
the various database applications and users. The main objective of this literature review 
will be to establish a theoretical framework for databases and their applications and to 
understand  how  perpetuators  of  cybercrime  exploit  vulnerabilities  in  the  database 
management system (DBMS).  
This  chapter  also  outlines  the  history  of  database  evolution  and  describes  database 
architecture and the various components of database management systems (DBMS). It 
briefly  outlines  the  various  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  database  management 
systems  and  database  related  incidence  over  the  past  ten  years.  Finally,  the  chapter 
describes existing security flaws, vulnerabilities and the various challenges in database 
forensics. It concludes with a brief discussion on the various forensic artifacts presently 
contained in a database.  
Chapter 3 is forensic examination framework and presents a detailed discussion on the 
importance  of  having  a  standard  forensic  framework  that  meets  the  changing 
requirements of a cyber-forensics examination. Eight forensic frameworks proposed by 
various  experts  in  the  forensic  field  are  discussed  in  detail  and  the  frameworks  are 
compared to show how they differ from each other. The chapter analyses the various 
advantages of using a particular model or framework against other models and the effects 
on a digital examination.  
Chapter 4 is a generic workflow for database forensic examination and introduces the 
concept of building forensic computing capabilities within an organisation and discusses 
requirement analysis of the proposed system. It also discusses the functional and non-
functional requirements of the application. After the requirement analysis, the forensic 
workflow  is  introduced  with  a  brief  overview  of  the  pre-examination  stage  and  the  
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importance  of  documenting  all  activities  related  to  an  incident  will  be  emphasised. 
Following  this,  the  generic  high-level  workflow  for  database  forensic  examination  is 
discussed, followed by detailed discussion of all six different phases of the workflow.  
Chapter 5 evaluates the workflow that was proposed in chapter 4 on a qualitative and 
case study basis and show that the proposed workflow can be successfully applied to real 
life  database  incidents.  This  chapter  provides  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  proposed 
system implementation with flow charts and visually captivating design interfaces. Then 
the workflow is evaluated on a qualitative and case study basis and is compared with 
existing frameworks to identify the various advantages and disadvantages. Finally, this 
chapter concludes by highlighting the various limitations of the proposed workflow. 
Chapter 6 is conclusion that highlights the major results of the research presented in this 
thesis and discusses the potential future direction for this work. 
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2  Background 
2.1  Overview 
This literature review is a collation of relevant database forensics publications to assist 
the  reader  in  understanding  the  complexity  involved  in  database  forensics.  Database 
forensics  publications  predominantly  feature  the  research  of  Fowler,  SQL  Server 
Forensic  Analysis  (Fowler,  SQL  Server  Forensic  Analysis,  2009),  Wright,  Oracle 
Forensic (Wright, 2007) and Litchfield’s seven - part series publication based on Oracle 
10g. These articles are written at a practical level, aimed at database administrators, but 
the authors do not attempt to focus on the underlying theory, nor present a generic model, 
but offer only a case-to-case basis of issue resolution.  
When analysing database forensics, it is essential for examiners to understand the key 
components of the database. This literature review aims to bridge that gap by exploring 
all  the  critical  components  in  a  database  and  accumulating  the  various  research 
publications under one knowledge base.  
  
2.2  Database, Database Applications and Database Users 
Data according to  the  Britannica Encyclopedia can be defined  as  factual  information 
(Merriam-Webster,  2012)  that  can  be  recorded  and  has  implicit  meaning,  such  as  a 
collection of names, addresses and telephone numbers of people (Elmasri & Navathe, 
2000, p. 4). A collection of logically related data that is designed to meet the information 
needs of an organisation can be described as a database (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 14). 
 
Great  amounts  of  data  stored  in  a  database  are  managed  by  a  database  management 
system (DBMS) and applications enable users to define, create, maintain and control 
access to a database by the use of various data management languages such as Data 
Definition Language (DDL), Data Manipulation Language (DML) and Structured Query 
Language (SQL) (TechTerms, 2012). DDL is used to define the database and specify data  
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types, structures and constraints on the data that is to be stored in the database. DML is 
used to insert, update, delete and retrieve data from the database and SQL is used to 
query data (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 16). 
 
Databases have become an integral part of our day-to-day life. Government enterprises, 
small, medium and large organizations such as banks, credit card companies, airlines, 
travel  and  insurance  agents,  stock  markets,  online  retailers  and  telecommunications 
industries use databases to store data. This can include customer information, accounts, 
loans,  day-to-day  banking  transactions,  credit  card  purchases  and  monthly  statement 
generations (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000) & (Silberschatz, Korth, & Sudarshan, 2006). 
 
A database has various users. A small personal database such as an address book can be 
maintained and used by one person, however many users are involved in the creation, 
design, use and maintenance of much larger databases. Database users can be broadly 
classified into two categories, i.e. actors on the scene and actors behind the scene as 
explained in the following subsections (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 12). 
 
Actors on the Scene: These users have jobs that involve day-to-day use of the database 
and they are: 
Database Administrators (DBA): They are responsible in overseeing and managing 
common  resources  used  by  multiple  users  within  the  organisation.  The  DBA  is 
primarily  responsible  for  authorising  access  to  the  database,  coordinating  and 
monitoring its use and for acquiring software and hardware resources. The DBA is 
also accountable for breach of security and database performances issues.  
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Database Designers: They are responsible for identifying the data to be stored in the 
database and for choosing appropriate structures to represent and store this data. It is 
the  primary  responsibility  of  the  database  designer  to  communicate  with  all 
prospective database users, understand their requirements, and develop processing 
requirements of the users.  
End Users: They access the database for querying, updating and generating reports. 
The database primarily exists for their use. There are several categories of end users 
as follows: 
Casual End Users: They occasionally access the database and may need different 
information each time. They use a sophisticated database query language to specify 
their requests. Users in this category are middle to high-level managers and other 
occasional browsers.  
Naïve or Parametric End Users: These users constantly access databases for querying 
and updating data. They use carefully programmed and tested standard queries and 
updates  called  canned  transactions.  Examples  of  these  users  are  bank  tellers, 
reservation clerks etc. 
Sophisticated End Users: The users in this category familiarise themselves with the 
facilities  of  the  DBMS  to  implement  their  applications  to  meet  their  complex 
requirements. Such users may include, but not limited to, engineers, scientists and 
business analysts.  
Stand-Alone  Users:  The  users  in  this  category  use  databases  for  personal  needs, 
therefore  most  of  the  databases  are  ready-made  program  packages  that  provide 
graphics-based interfaces and easy to use menus, e.g. Personal Accounts database, 
Address book etc.  
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System  Analyst  & Application Programmers: The users  in  this  category  are also 
known as software engineers. The system analysts determine the requirements of end 
users,  especially  naïve  and  parametric  end-users,  and  develop  specifications  for 
canned transactions that meet their needs. The Application Programmer implements 
these specifications  as  a program.  They also  test,  debug, document and maintain 
these canned transactions.     
Actors behind the Scene: These users are typically not interested in the database itself, 
but they are involved in the development and implementation of the DBMS package as 
software. They are: 
DBMS System Designers and Implementers: These people design and implement the 
DBMS modules and interfaces as a software package. 
Tool  Developers:  This  includes  people  who  design  and  implement  tools  and  the 
software  packages  that  facilitate  system  design.  Generally,  tools  are  optional 
packages  that  are  purchased  separately  and  in  many  cases,  independent  software 
vendors develop and market these tools. 
Operators and Maintenance Personnel: These are responsible for the actual running 
and maintenance of the hardware and software environments of the database system. 
2.3  Database Systems Architecture 
The origin of databases goes back to libraries, businesses and medical records with a long 
history of information storage, indexing and retrieval. Modern databases originated from 
pre-stage, flat-file based systems to its present form (Impagliazzo, 2004). 
During  the  sixties,  the  file-based  system  was  developed  and  computers  became  cost 
effective  for  private  companies,  with  increased  storage  capabilities.  This  became  the 
precursor for database systems. In the mid-sixties, hierarchical and network data models  
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were  developed,  representing  the  first  generation  of  database  management  systems 
(DBMS).  In  the  seventies,  the  relational  database  model  was  proposed  after  the 
publication of the E.F.Codeseminal paper entitled ‘A relational model of data for large 
shared data banks’ addressing the weakness of the first generation systems (Codd, 1970, 
p. 377). The prototype of RDBMSs (Relational Database Management System) came into 
existence with Ingres – Developed at UCB, led to Sybase & MS SQL Server, they used 
QUEL as query language. System R – Developed at IBM San Jose let to SQL/DS & 
DB2, Oracle, and used SWQUEL as query language (Codd, 1970, pp. 377-387). 
 
In the mid-seventies, Chen (1976) published the paper entitled ‘The Entity-Relationship 
model  (ER)  towards  a  unified  view  of  data’,  and  with  this  publication,  the  Entity-
Relationship (ER) model was proposed. This paper became the cornerstone in software 
engineering, particularly in the field of computer-aided software engineering (CASE) and 
one of the most cited papers in the computer software field. This paper was adopted as 
the  Meta  model  for  the  ANSI  Standard  in  Information  Resource  Directory  System 
(IRDS),  and  the  ER  approach  has  been  ranked  as  the  top  methodology  for  database 
design by several fortune 500 companies (IEEE Computer Society, 2012).  
 
The latter part of this decade saw the development of commercial RDBMS like Oracle, 
Ingres and DB2. In 1980, SQL (Structured Query Language) was standardised by ISO 
(International  Standards  Organisation).  During  the  early  nineties  OODBMS  (Object 
Oriented  Database  Management  System)  and  later  ORDBMS  (Object  Relational 
Database  Management  System)  were  developed.  In  the  mid-nineties  internet-based 
databases and support for web database integration were developed. Just before the turn 
of the century, XML 1.0 (Extensible Mark-up Language) was integrated with DBMS 
after it was ratified by W3C and this led to the development of XML databases (Chen, 
1976, p. 9).  
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In 2000, mobile databases and point of sale transitions came into existences with the 
consolidation of vendors and three companies (Oracle, Microsoft & IBM) dominated the 
database market (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 26; Vaughn, 2003). 
Database technology has a successful record as the backbone of information technology 
and has become a critical component of modern computing (Chaudhuri & Weikum, 2000, 
p.  1;  Hellerstein,  Stonebraker,  &  Hamilton,  2007,  p.  142)  enabling  users  to  access 
information  at  any  time.  The  spread  of  computer  networks  with  different  physical 
characteristics, and the extensive need for information sharing, have created a demand for 
cooperation among pre-existing, distributed, heterogeneous and autonomous information 
sources (Hurson  & Jiao, 2005, p. 1). This creates an immense challenge to forensics 
examiners in locating, identifying and interpreting information intelligently, efficiently 
and transparently without tampering evidence (Hurson & Jiao, 2005, p. 2). Consequently, 
it is essential that forensics examiners understand the architecture of a database before 
attempting to uncover database incidents (Silberschatz, Korth, & Sudarshan, 2006, p. 24). 
Database architecture may be classified based on various parameters, but the commonly 
used parameters are physical infrastructure, services and distribution, and can be broadly 
classified as the following: 
1.  Monolithic or Centralised Database Topology 
2.  Parallel Database Topology 
3.  Client Server Topology 
4.  Peer-to-peer Topology 
5.  Distributed Databases 
6.  Multi-databases or heterogeneous distributed databases  
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Monolithic or Centralised Databases Topology 
In  the  Monolithic  system,  each  component  presents  a  well-defined  interface  to  the 
component above, as illustrated in Figure 1 (Weddell, 2006, p. 2). The database system 
runs on a single computer platform and does not interact with other computer systems. 
The centralised database is characterised by its single processing unit, without distinction 
between its services and without any notion of distribution. This system can be further 
classified as single user configuration and multiuser configuration (Hurson & Jiao, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 1: Monolithic or Centralised Systems (Weddell, 2006) 
Parallel Databases Topology 
In the parallel system, several processing resources cooperate with each other to resolve 
user requests as illustrated in Figure 2 (Weddell, 2006). There is no notion of data and 
control distribution. In addition, there are no distinctions between services provided by 
the  database  management  system.  Parallel  configurations  are  aimed  at  improving  the 
performance and output, by distributing various tasks among several processing units 
(Hurson & Jiao, 2005).  
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Figure 2: Parallel Database Systems (Weddell, 2006) 
 
Client Server Topology 
Figure 3 shows the structure of a client server system. According to Weddell (2006), the 
functionality in this system is split between the server and multiple clients. This topology 
can  be  grouped  into  multiple  clients/single  server  and  multiple  client/multiple  server 
configurations.  Functionality  and  processing  capability  of  the  client  processor  and 
communication speed between the client and server also distinguishes two classes of the 
client/server, namely transaction server i.e. thin client, and data server i.e. fat client. This 
topology  is  one-step  towards  distributed  processing  and  offers  a  user-friendly 
environment, simplicity of implementation and a high degree of hardware used at the 
server side (Hurson & Jiao, 2005).  
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Figure 3: Client Server System (Weddell, 2006) 
Peer-to-peer Topology 
The peer-to-peer topology is a direct evolution of the client/server topology, this system 
can handle user processes and data processes placed on every machine, unlike the client 
server, topology where user process and data process handling is separate. From a data 
logical perspective, client/server and peer-to-peer topology provide the same view of data 
i.e. data transparency, the main distinction lies in the architectural paradigm that is used 
to realise this level of transparency (Hurson & Jiao, 2005). 
 
Distributed Databases 
Data distribution is the concept behind distributed databases and brings the advantage of 
distributed computing to the database management domain. A distributed system is a 
collection of processors interconnected by a computer network. Data distribution is an 
effort to improve performance by reducing communication costs, and to improve quality 
of service in case of network failure. In this system, data is distributed and stored in 
locations close to the application domain(s) that uses it. Disks and memory (processors) 
do not share resources  and are more distinct and the underlying platform is possibly 
parallel (Hurson & Jiao, 2005). 
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Multi-databases or heterogeneous distributed databases 
In the multi-database… system (Figure 4 & 5), data is distributed and stored in several 
locations, the processes are more distinguished, underlying platforms could be parallel 
and processing nodes are autonomous. Due to this autonomy, local databases can join or 
leave the global information infrastructure at will. These databases are more dynamic and 
robust than distributed databases i.e. the system has the flexibility to expand and shrink 
more rapidly. The multi-database is designed using a bottom-up approach and is based on 
the integration and interoperability of pre-existing databases (Hurson & Jiao, 2005). 
 
 
Figure 4: Multi-database systems without a gateway (Weddell, 2006) 
 
Figure 5: Multi-database with gateway (Weddell, 2006) 
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Components of a Database Management System 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Components of a DBMS (Hellerstein, Stonebraker, & Hamilton, 2007) 
 
There are five main components in a typical DBMS, as illustrated in Figure 6 
1.  The Client Communication Manager (CCM) 
2.  DBMS Process Manager (PM- 2) 
3.  Relational Query Processor (RQP-3) 
4.  Transactional Storage Manager (TSM-4) 
5.  Shared Components and Utilities (SCU-5)  
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The  Client  Communication  Manager  (CCM)  handles  the  connection  between  the 
database and various applications via the ODBC or JDBC connectivity protocol in two-
tier or client  server systems.  It  does  this  via a webserver or a transaction-processing 
monitor, which in turn uses a protocol to proxy the communications, the client and the 
DBMS in a three-tier system. The CCM also responds to SQL commands from the caller 
and returns both data and control messages as appropriate. 
DBMS  Process  Manager  (PM-  2)  handles  admission  control  and  ensures  that  the 
thread’s data and control outputs are connected via the communication manager to the 
client. 
Relational Query Processor (RQP-3) handles the code execution after the command is 
admitted and allocated as a thread of control. This module also checks if the user is 
authorised to run the query and compiles the user’s SQL query text into an internal query 
plan. Once compiled, the resulting query plan is handled via the plan executor, which 
consists of a suite of relational algorithm implementations operators for executing any 
query. 
Transactional  Storage  Manager  (TSM-4)  manages  all  data  access  i.e.  read  and 
manipulation calls i.e. create, update, delete. The storage system includes algorithms and 
data structures for organising and accessing data on disk. The TSM also includes basic 
structure like tables, indexes and buffer management modules that decide the type of data 
to transfer between disk and memory. 
Shared Components and Utilities (SCU-5) have various components that are vital to 
the  operation  of  a  full  functional  database  management  system.  The  catalogue  and 
memory manager are invoked as utilities during any transactions. The catalogue is used 
by  the  query  processor  during  authentication,  parsing  and  query  optimisation.  The 
memory  manager  is  used  throughout  the  DBMS  whenever  memory  needs  to  be 
dynamically allocated or reallocated.   
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The Administration, Monitoring and Utilities are used to manage the system and run 
independently of any particular query, keeping the database completely well-tuned and 
reliable. 
 
Advantages of using a Database Management System  
The advantages to using a database management system are as follows: 
Controlling  Redundancy:  Redundancy  can  be  defined  as  the  duplication  of  the 
same data once in file group and user group that leads to multiple issues, such as 
duplication  of  user  efforts,  wastage  of  storage  space  and  inconsistency  in  large 
database.  The  DBMS  eliminates  these  redundancies  by  integrating  a  view  of 
different user groups during database design and preventing redundant  data from 
being created (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 15).  
Restricting Unauthorised Access and improved security: The protection of data 
within a database from unauthorised users is called database security (Connolly & 
Begg, 2010, p. 28). A system with multiple user access can cause serious issues if 
there  is  no  access  control,  e.g.  employees  can  access  the  pay  slip  of  another 
employee or access confidential information for privileged users. To prevent such 
mishaps DBMS has security and authorisation subsystems, which a DBA uses to 
create accounts and to specify, account restrictions, and the DBMS has the capability 
to enforce these restrictions automatically (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 16).  
Providing persistent storage for program objects and data structures: Persistent 
storage of program objects and data structures is an important function of a database 
system and with the emergence of object-oriented database systems most DBMS 
these days provide this facility, which helps application programmers store complex 
objects  permanently  in  databases  instead  of  calling  these  objects  each  time  it  is 
required (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 16).  
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Permitting  Inference  and  Actions  using  rules:  Most  database  systems  provide 
capabilities for defining deduction rules to inference new information from stored 
database facts e.g. student enrolments can identify students who are on probation and 
prevent  them  from  re-enrolment.  This  can  be  accomplished  by  specifying  rules, 
which,  when  complied  and  maintained  by  DBMS,  can  determine  all  students  on 
probation.  Most  modern  databases  have  powerful  functionalities,  such  as  active 
database systems, which provide active rules that can automatically initiate actions 
(Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, pp. 16-17).  
Providing  multiple  user  interfaces:  The  level  of  technical  knowledge  varies 
between  various  users  of  a  database;  hence,  DBMS  provide  a  variety  of  user 
interfaces. These include query language for casual users, programming language 
interfaces for application programmers and developers, forms and command codes 
for parametric users and menu driven and natural language interfaces for stand-alone 
users (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 17). 
Representing  complex  relationships  among  data:  DBMS  has  the  capacity  to 
represent a wide variety of complex relationships among data as well as the ability to 
retrieve and update related data easily and efficiently (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 
17).  
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Enforcing  Integrity  Constraints:  Database  integrity  refers  to  the  validity  and 
consistency  of  stored  data.  Integrity  is  usually  expressed  in  terms  of constraints, 
which are consistency rules that the database is not permitted to violate (Connolly & 
Begg, 2010, p. 28). Most database applications have certain integrity constraints that 
can be defined and enforced by these constraints; the simplest integrity constraint 
involves specifying a data type for each data item (Elmasri & Navathe, 2000, p. 17). 
Providing Backup and Recovery Modern: DBMS unlike file-based systems provide 
facilities to minimise the amount of processing that is lost following a failure. The 
ability to recover nearly all the lost data after failure makes DBMS a critical system 
within an IT infrastructure. 
 
Disadvantages of using a Database Management 
 
The disadvantages of using a database management system are as follows: 
Complexity: The various functionalities that are infused in a database make it an 
extremely complex piece of software. This complexity forces the database designer, 
developer, administrator and end-user to understand all the functionalities within the 
database to take full advantage of it, failure to understand the system can lead to bad 
design decisions and security vulnerabilities, which can have serious consequence for 
an organisation (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 30). 
Size: The complexity and breadth of functionality makes the DBMS an extremely 
large piece of software, occupying several terabytes of disk space, which requires 
substantial amount of memory to run efficiently (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 30).   
 
30 
 
Cost  of  DBMS:  The  cost  of  a  DBMS  varies  significantly  depending  on  various 
database vendors and their sales policies. It also depends on the environment and 
functionalities provided (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 30).The cost of licensing a large 
mainframe multiuser DBMS servicing, hundreds of users can cost millions of dollars. 
Added to the licensing cost is the annual support cost billed quarterly or annually 
depending on the volume of licenses purchased (Oracle Licensing, 2011).  
Additional hardware cost: The increase in user data proportionally increases disk 
space,  which  requires  organisations  to  purchase  additional  storage  space.  As 
technology improves, operating system vendors upgrade systems to match industry 
standard,  which  requires  procurement  of  additional  hardware  resulting  in  further 
expenditure (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 30).  
Cost of conversion: In some situations, the cost of DBMS and extra hardware may 
be relatively small compared with the cost of converting existing applications to run 
on the new DBMS and hardware. This cost also includes training staff to use the new 
system, and the cost of acquiring specialists to help with the conversion and running 
of the system (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 31).  
Performance:  A  database  management  system  is  written  to  cater  multiple 
applications  unlike  a  file  based  system  that  is  written  for  a  specific  application, 
therefore some applications may not run very fast (Connolly & Begg, 2010, p. 31).  
Greater  impact  of  a  failure:  One  of  the  key  components  and  advantages  of  a 
DBMS is centralisation of data. Unfortunately, this component also increases the 
vulnerability of the database as all users, and applications rely on the availability of 
DBMS and failure of key components can bring operations to a halt (Connolly & 
Begg, 2010, p. 31). 
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2.4  Cyber Forensics 
The recent development of cyber forensics as a profession and scientific discipline has its 
roots in the efforts of law enforcement to address the growth in computer related crime 
(Casey, 2011, p. 10). The soaring increase in the number of internet users (MMG, 2011) 
combined  with  the  constant  computerisation  of  business  processes  has  created  new 
opportunities  for  computer  criminals,  terrorists  as  well  as  corporate  and  disciplinary 
transgressions.  Ongoing  study  reveals  that  computer  related  incidents  are  costing 
businesses and government organisations billions of dollars (Richards, 2009) each year 
(Vacca, 2004). 
Thirty  years  ago,  few  persons  perceived  the  possibility  of  computers  becoming  an 
integral part of everyday life, and consequently did not identify the risk of electronic 
crimes increasing, or the potential impact these crimes would have in the financial sector. 
Most computers in this era were mainframes, used by an exclusive realm of trained or 
educated people with specialised skills who saw a way to make money by manipulating 
computer  data  in  what  became  well  known  as  one-half  cent  crime  (Nelson,  Phillips, 
Enfinger, & Steuart, 2006).  
As law enforcement officers did not know enough about computers, they did not ask the 
right  questions  or  act  to  preserve  evidence  for  trial.  They  began  to  attend  programs 
offered by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), designed to train law 
enforcement  in  recovering  digital  data  to  solve  crimes  like  one-half  cent  (Nelson, 
Phillips, Enfinger, & Steuart, 2006). 
When personal computers appeared and replaced main frames and disk operating systems 
(DOS), the forensic tools used were very simple and written in C and assembly language 
and only government agencies such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and 
the U.S Internal Revenue Service (IRS) used such tools.   
 
32 
 
In the mid-eighties, a new tool called “XTree Gold” appeared that could recognise file 
types and retrieved lost or deleted files. Norton DiskEdit soon followed and became the 
best tool for finding deleted files (Nelson, et al., 2006, p. 6). 
By  the  early  nineties  specialised  tools  for  computer  forensics  were  available.  The 
International  Association  of  Computer  Investigative  Specialists  (IACIS)  introduced 
training  on  currently  available  software  for  forensics  examination,  and  IRS  created 
search-warrant programs. No commercial software for computer forensics was available 
however until AST Data created Expert Witness for the Macintosh; this software had the 
ability  to  recover  deleted  files  and  fragments  of  deleted  files.  One  of  the  ASR  Data 
partners left and developed EnCase, which has become a popular computer forensic tool 
in the market today (Nelson, et al., 2006, p. 6). 
In  2002,  the  Scientific  Working  Group  for  Digital  Evidence  (SWGDE1)  published 
guidelines for training and b est practices. At the  same, time the American Society of 
Crime  Laboratory  Directors  (ADCLD)  proposed  requirements  for  digital  evidence  
examiners in forensic laboratories. In 2008, the American Academy of Forensic Science 
(AAFS)  created  a  n ew  section  devoted  to   Digital  and  Multimedia  Science.  T his 
development advanced digital forensics as a scientific discipline and provided a common 
ground for the varied members of the forensic science community to share knowle dge 
and address current challenges (Casey, 2011, p. 10). 
2.5  Database Related Incidents 
As the increase in demand for information systems and databases continues to grow, the 
information they contain continues to expand and become a target for improper activities. 
Most organisations keep sensitive information about their customers in databases and the 
breach of this information could lead to failure in meeting the three primary goals of 
                                                 
1 http://www.swgde.org/  
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information security, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) (Williams, 
2007, p. 3). 
Listed below are some examples of data breaches in the last decade. 
In 2000, music retailer CD Universe was compromised by a hacker known as Maxus, 
who stole credit card numbers from the retailer’s database and tried to extort money 
from  the  retailer.  When  his  demands  were  refused,  he  posted  thousands  of 
customer’s credit card details on the internet (Natan, 2005, p. 2). 
In  December  2000,  online  retailer  Egghead.com  customer  database  was 
compromised  and  approximately  3.5  million  credit  card  numbers  were  allegedly 
stolen. The company went out of business shortly thereafter (Natan, 2005, p. 3). 
In 2001, Bibliofind, a division of Amazon was attacked and the transgressors stole 
approximately 100,000 credit card details and maintained access to the database for 
months after being discovered. As a result, they had to forgo a large portion of their 
revenue (Natan, 2005, p. 3). 
In March 2001, the Federal Bureau of Examination (FBI) reported that almost fifty 
banks and retail web sites were attacked and compromised by Russian and Ukrainian 
hackers (Natan, 2005, p. 3). 
In November 2001, Playboy.com was attacked and credit card numbers stolen, the 
hackers then sent e-mails to the customers with their credit card information (Natan, 
2005, p. 3). 
In the course of 2001, Indiana University was successfully attacked twice and private 
information such as social security numbers and addresses were stolen (Natan, 2005, 
p. 3) 
In 2002, Guess.com was subjected to SQL injection attack and approximately 200, 
000 credit card details were stolen (Clarke, 2009, p. 11).  
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In  2003,  PetCo.com  faced  a  data  breach  by  SQL  injection  attack,  losing 
approximately 500,000 credit card details (Clarke, 2009, p. 11). 
In  June  2005,  Card  System,  a  third  party  payment  processor  for  MasterCard, 
disclosed that over 40 million credit card numbers from their database might have 
been exposed during a security incident (Suffern, 2010). The hackers exploited the 
vulnerability of SQL injection flaw in the database that was not patched (Clarke, 
2009, p. 11). 
In  December  2005,  Guidance  Software,  developers  of  EnCase,  discovered  that 
hackers exploited SQL injection flaw in its database server, exposing the financial 
records of 3,800 customers (Clarke, 2009, p. 11). 
In April 2006, a hacker held Virginia’s electronic prescription drug database hostage 
and demanded a $10 million ransom. The hacker claimed to have gained access to 
more than 35 million prescription drug records in the online database, which was 
established in 2006 to prevent prescription drug abuse (Cyber Crime, 2009).  
During December 2006 and January 2007, U.S. discount retailer TJX, the parent 
company of TJ Maxx and Marshals, disclosed that 45.7 million credit and debit cards 
had been stolen from their database during a security incident (Suffern, 2010) & 
(Clarke, 2009, p. 11). 
In  August  2007,  the  United  Nations  website  was  defaced  via  SQL  injection 
vulnerability by a transgressor in order to display anti-US messages (Higgins, 2010). 
In October 2009, a data analyst from TSA Colorado Springs Operation Center was 
terminate for tampering with the Terrorist screening database, he subsequently faced 
charges for attempting to tamper with the database (Ericka, 2010).   
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In April 2011, Sony suffered a massive data breach in its online video game network, 
resulting in compromise of approximately 77 million users’ credit card details and 
100 million customer account details from its servers. Subsequently, Sony had two 
more breaches  after the initial  breach  and  according to  security expert Dr. Gene 
Spafford of Purdue University, Sony was using an outdated Apache server that was 
unpatched and had no firewall installed (Baker & Finkle, 2011). 
In  July  2011,  servers  of  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO)  were 
compromised  by  anonymous  hackers,  who  stole  approximately  1  gigabyte  of 
restricted information and posted some of the information on a PDF sharing site to 
prove its claim (Montalbano, 2011). 
In 2011 according to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, there have been 234 breaches 
affecting over hundreds of millions of individuals. (Chickowski E. , 2011). 
HBGary Federal Asset – An SQL injection attack, resulting in the breach of 60,000 
confidential e-mails, executive social media and customer details (Chickowski E. , 
2011). 
RSA Assets - An employee opened a spear phishing e-mail resulting in the loss of 
sensitive information pertaining to RSA’s security Id authentication products. 
Epsilon Assets – Was compromised via a spear phishing attack, approximately 2% of 
its corporate clients e-mail addresses were compromised (Chickowski E. , 2011). 
Texas  Comptroller`s  Office  –  The  names,  social  security  numbers  and  mailing 
addresses of approximately 3.5 million individuals were exposed for nearly a full 
year on a unencrypted publicly available server (Chickowski E. , 2011). 
In March 2012, Hackers  breached Environment  Protection Agency  Database that 
stores data related to superfund program containing Social Security Numbers, bank  
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routing  numbers  and  home  addresses  of  7,800  current  and  past  employees.  The 
hackers used phishing techniques to gain access to the server (Kaplan, 2012). 
 
In  September  2012,  8500  former  school  employees  of  University  of  Georgia`s 
names, social security number, and other sensitive information was compromised by 
intruders who reset passwords IT Staff who had access to sensitive information and 
accessed files (Shearer, 2012). This is the university`s second breach within a year. 
In  2011  university  officials  discovered  personal  information  of  18,000  staff  and 
faculty  members  were  publicly  available  on  web  servers  for  at  least  three  years 
(Colon, 2012). 
 
In  October  2012,  hackers  breached  a  server  at  Northwest  Florida  State  College 
(NFSC) in Niceville and access personal information of nearly 300,000 students and 
possibly employees resulting in 67 incidents of known identity theft. In 2010 NFSC 
was among six Florida community colleges that experienced a breach that publicly 
exposed the information of staff and students (Walker, 2012). 
 
In  November  2012,  Chicago  board  of  elections  created  a  temporary  website  but 
information of 1200 job applicants became publicly viewable on the FTP site with 
the names, addresses, driver’s  license numbers, and the last  four digits of social 
security number (Byrne & Dardick, 2012). Chicago Board of Elections dealt with a 
larger breach on 2006, when 780,000 registered voters information was posted on its 
website and was publicly available (Walker, Chicago Board of Elections site exposes 
job applicant info, 2012).   
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In  November  2012,  hackers  stole  tax  records  of  4.5  million  South  Carolina 
consumers and businesses. The hackers used state approved credentials to enter the 
revenue department systems and bypassed the security measures and tools to steal 
the data. The hack was not discovered for 16 days until the state government was 
informed by the secret service (Shain, 2012). 
 
2.5.1  Summary 
The data breaches trend in the last decade clearly shows that organisations are not taking 
their  information  security  goals  of  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  very 
seriously. Some of the organisations have been breached multiple times and opportunists 
were  able  to  exploit  existing  system  vulnerabilities  such  as  SQL  injection  flaws  and 
unpatched databases, to steal data. Hackers alone are not the only parties responsible for 
the  data  breaches;  the  lack  of  data  regulations,  bad  accounting  practices,  fraud  and 
various corporate scandals and crimes equally contribute to the overall security lapse. 
This entire situation can be salvaged by enforcing new regulations for technical control 
and monitoring existing systems with strict IT Auditing, and associated financial and 
criminal penalties for noncompliance (Natan, 2005, p. 5). 
 
2.6  Database Security Flaws 
According  to  Litchfield  (2007),  databases  have  serious  security  flaws.  Oracle  has 
published 69 security alerts on its critical patch update and security alert page (Oracle, 
2011). Microsoft SQL server and its associated components have been subjected to some 
36-security issues. DB2 has had about 20 published security issues. MySQL has had 
some 25 issues; PostgreSQL has had about a dozen, and likewise for Informix.  
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The  problem  is  that  comparing  these  figures  is  pointless  because  different  databases 
receive different levels of scrutiny from security researchers. To-date, Microsoft SQL 
Server and Oracle have probably received the most scrutiny, which accounts for the large 
number of issues documented for both databases. Some databases have been around for 
many years and others are relatively new. Different databases have different kinds of 
flaws; some databases are not vulnerable to a whole class of problems that might plague 
others (Litchfield, Anley, Heasman, & Grindlay, 2005).  
Even defining databases is  problematic, because Oracle  bundles  an entire application 
environment with its database server, with many samples and pre-built applications. This 
raises the question as  to  whether these  applications  should  be considered  part of the 
database and whether Microsoft’s MSDE is a different database than an SQL Server. 
They are certainly used in different ways and have a number of different components, but 
they were subject to the UDP (User Datagram Protocol) (Hoover, 2003, p. 6) Resolution 
Service bug that listens on port 1434 in a default installation of SQL Server 2000 and was 
the basis for the Slammer worm exploitation (Litchfield, Anley, Heasman, & Grindlay, 
2005). 
Even  if  it  were  possible  to  determine  some  weighted  metric  that  accounted  for  age, 
stability,  scope  and  severity  of  published  vulnerabilities,  it  would  be  restricted  to 
considering only patchable issues, rather than the inherent security features provided by 
the database. It is not fair to compare the comprehensive audit capability of Oracle with 
the more limited capability of MySQL. Similarly, a database that supports securable view 
cannot  be  considered  more  secure  than  a  database  that  does  not  implement  that 
abstraction.  By  default,  PostgreSQL  is  possibly  the  most  security-aware  database 
available, but you cannot connect to it over the network unless you explicitly enable that 
functionality. Should we take default configurations into account? The list of criteria is 
lengthy  and  drawing  any  firm  conclusion  from  it  is  imprudent  (Litchfield,  Anley, 
Heasman, & Grindlay, 2005, p. 5).   
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Ultimately, the more you know about a database, the better you will be able to secure it. 
Litchfield, Anley, Heasman & Grindlay (2005), classified database security flaws in eight 
categories as highlighted in Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7: Database Vulnerabilities (Litchfield, Anley, Heasman, & Grindlay, 2005, p. 5) 
The flaws are as follows: 
Flaws in Network Protocols:  
Network protocol can be defined as “a specification for the format and relative timing of 
the message exchanged” in a spatially distributed system (Gong & Syverson, 1995, p. 46) 
by providing a point-to-point sender-initiated data transfer service (Whalen, Bishop, & 
Engle, 2005, p. 1). 
Although  network  protocols  such  as  Address  Resolution  Protocol  (ARP)  (Plummer, 
1982), Routing Information Protocol (RIP) (Hedrick, 1988), Exterior Gateway Protocol 
(EGP), Internet Control Message Protocol  (ICMP), Post Office Protocols (POP), File 
Transfer  Protocols  (FTP)  and  Simple  Network  Management  Protocols  (SNMP)  are  
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fundamentally insecure (Bellovin, 1989) with continuing security vulnerabilities (Lootah, 
Enck, & McDaniel, 2007) and the ambiguities in protocol specifications such as RFCs (S, 
1996,  p.  5)  that  are  misinterpreted  by  developers,  the  majority  of  database  related 
vulnerabilities  and  incidents  identified  nowadays  according  to  Paul  Lesov  from  the 
university  of  Minnesota  are  due  to  the  changing  environment,  non-secure 
implementations and user errors (Lesov, 2008, p. 1). 
The flaws in the network protocols can be further sub classified into Unauthenticated and 
Authenticated flaws and are discussed below.  
Unauthenticated flaws in the network protocols 
According to Litchfield et al. (2005) SQL Slammer worm is the most famous bug in the 
unauthenticated  flaw  network  protocol  category.  The  SQL  Server  Resolution  Service 
operates over a UDP protocol, by default on port 1434. It exposes a number of functions, 
two of which were vulnerable to buffer overflow issues CAN-2002-0649 (NVD, 2002). 
Another  SQL  server  problem  in  the  same  category  i.e.  Unauthenticated  flaws  in  the 
network protocols was the hello bug (CAN-2002-1123) which exploited a flaw in the 
initial session setup code on TCP port 1433 (CVE, 2002).(p.5). 
The  Oracle  Database  had  multiple  flaws  in  the  environmental  variable  expansion  in 
“extproc” mechanism (CAN-2004-1363) that can exploit without a username or password 
(CVE,  2004)  and  allow  remote,  unauthenticated  buffer  overflow  (CAN-2003-0634) 
(NVD, 2003). Oracle’s authentication handling code has a flaw whereby an overly long 
username triggers an exploitable stake overflow (CAN-2003-0095) (CVE, 2003). DB2`s 
JDBC Applet Server (Bugtraq ID 11401) has a flaw that allow a remote, unauthenticated 
user to trigger a buffer overflow (Symantec , 2004). 
 
Authenticated Flaw in Network Protocols  
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There are substantially fewer bugs in this category as most other bugs are related to web 
application server  components.  DB2  has  a flaw in  the Windows  environment (CAN-
2004-0795) whereby a remote user could connect to the DB2REMOTECMD named pipe, 
subject to Windows Authentication, and would be able to execute arbitrary commands 
with the privilege of the db2admin user, which is normally an Administrator account 
(CVE, 2004). 
Another  bug  in  this  category  is  related  to  a  transgressor  specifying  an  overtly  long 
LC_TYPE. The database applies this after the user authenticates, triggering the overflow 
(Litchfield, 2005). 
 
Flaws in Authentication Protocols 
The use of strong password for authentication has been a big problem in cryptography 
despite  advances  in  both  symmetric  and  asymmetric  cryptosystems.  The  history  of 
password authentication has numerous examples of weak, easily compromised systems, 
most of which are still in use today (Hakları, 2006) & (Wu, 1997). Several database 
systems  have  weak  authentication  systems  such  as  plaintext  authentication  protocol, 
hashed passwords & the challenge-response system (Rasmussen, 2003, p. 2) where the 
password is passed on in a easily decrypted format that will permit intruders and other 
malicious users to deduce or guess the password (Hakları, 2006). 
Since the development  of strong authentication systems, databases  such as  Microsoft 
SQL Server obfuscates password by swapping 4-bit halves of a byte and x0Ring with 
0xA5 and most database vendors warn against the use of weak authentication systems 
already built into the database. However, this flaw exists in cases where the database 
administrator  sets  up  authentication  protocol  in  the  database  by  choosing  default 
configurations  and  the  databases  that  do  not  by  default  provide  strong,  encrypted 
mechanism for authentication (Litchfield et.el., 2005, p. 8).  
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In the past, MySQL had a number of serious problems with its authentication protocol in 
databases developed prior to version 4.1 (CVE-2000-0981), where the mathematical basis 
of the authentication algorithm had flaws, which lets a transgressor who can observe 
multiple authentications to quickly determine the password hash (CVE, 2000). 
In MySQL version 4.1 and 5.0 (CVE-2004-0627) a similar bug exists whereby a user 
could authenticate using an empty response to the server`s challenge, provided he or she 
passes certain flags to the remote server or via a zero-length scrambled string (CVE, 
2004). 
According to the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) and Common Vulnerabilities 
and  Exposures  (CVE)  CVE-2012-3137,  Oracle  11g  1  and  2  has  an  authentication 
protocol flaw that allows remote transgressors to obtain session key and salt for arbitrary 
users,  which  leaks  information  about  the  cryptographic  hash  (NVD,  2012)  &  (CVE, 
2012).  Transgressors merely  need to  know a valid username in  the database and the 
database name and by brute forcing the hashes and taking advantage of the authentication 
protocols  inadvertent  leakage  of  information  in  the  initial  handshake  can  obtain  data 
(Higgins, 2012). 
 
Unauthenticated Access to Functionality 
Some  components  associated  with  databases  permit  unauthenticated  access  to 
functionality that should really be authenticated. The TNS Listener in Oracle database 
servers, Oracle 8i and Oracle 9i, has a flaw that allows remote unauthenticated users to 
load and execute an arbitrary function via the extproc mechanism (CVE-2002-0567) by 
loading the “libc” or “msvert” library and executing the system function that allows the 
transgressor  to  execute  an  arbitrary  command  line  which  will  be  executed  with  the 
privileges of the user that the database is running i.e. oracle on UNIX systems and local 
system user on Windows (CVE, 2002).  
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In Oracle Application Server, E-business Suite, Enterprise Manager, Enterprise Manager 
Database Control, Oracle 10g, Oracle 8i and Oracle 9i there is a flaw (CVE-2004-1365) 
that allows any local user to execute commands in the security context of the user that 
Oracle is running. This bug works in exactly the same way as the bug reported in (CVE-
2002-0567), except that it takes advantage of the implicit trust that ‘extproc’ places in the 
local host (CVE, 2004) & (CVE, 2002). 
 
Arbitrary Code Execution in Intrinsic SQL Elements 
Most  databases  have  flaws  in  this  category  because  parsing  SQL  is  a  hard  problem. 
Developers are likely to make mistakes in their code and the buffer overflow and format 
string bugs in elements of the database`s SQL grammar that are not subject to the usual 
access control mechanism of GRANT and REVOKE. This class of bugs is more of a 
threat than it might initially appear, since these bugs can normally be triggered via SQL 
injection problems in the web-deployed applications and will take an exploiter from the 
internet into the administrative control of the database server in a single step (Litchfield 
et.el., 2005, p. 9). 
Microsoft’s SQL Server and Microsoft’s SQL Desktop Engine (MSDE) has a classic 
stack overflow flaw in ‘pwdencrypt’(CVE-2002-0624) which allows remote transgressors 
to gain control of the database and execute arbitrary code via SQL Server Authentication 
i.e. Unchecked Buffer in Password Encryption Procedure (CVE, 2002). 
Microsoft  SQL  Server  7  and  Server  2000  had  a  bug  (CVE-2001-0542)  that  allows 
transgressors with access to SQL Server to execute arbitrary code through the functions 
(1) raiserror, (2) formatmessage, or (3) xp_sprintf (CVE, 2001). 
Oracle has been subjected to several bugs in this category, according to the CVE website; 
Oracle has 64 bugs listed for SQL Injection. Although it’s normally to revoke access to 
Oracle  functions,  it  is  somewhat  problematic  and  according  to  Litchfield  (2005)  the 
TIME_ZONE session parameter and NUMTOYMINTERVAL, NUMTODSINTERVAL,  
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FROM_TZ  functions  are  all  subject  to  buffer  overflow  that  allow  a  transgressor  to 
execute arbitrary code (CVE , 2011). 
IBM`s DB2 Universal Database`s ‘Call’ mechanism was vulnerable to a buffer over flow 
that can be triggered by any user (Symantec Connect, 2004). Declaring a variable with an 
overly  long  data  type  name  in  Sybase  ASE  versions  prior  to  12.5.3  will  trigger  an 
overflow (Litchfield etal., 2005, p. 10). 
 
Arbitrary Code Execution in Securable SQL Elements 
In this category, the set of overflow and format string bugs that exist in functions that can 
be subject to access controls. Although the risks from these problems can be mitigated by 
revoking permissions to the objects in questions, they are normally accessible by default. 
Microsoft SQL Server  has  been affected by several  bugs  in  this  category, the buffer 
overflow  in  the  extended  stored  procedures  xp_setsqlsecurity  (CVE-2000-1088),  xp-
proxiedmetadata  (CVE-2000-1087),  xp_printstatements  (CVE-2000-1086), 
xp_updatecolvbm (CVE-2000-1084)  in Microsoft SQL Server 2000, and SQL Server 
Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly restrict the length of a buffer before calling 
the srv_paraminfo in the SQL Server API which allows a transgressor to cause a denial of 
service  or  execute  arbitrary  commands.  (CVE,  2000),  (CVE,  2001),  (CVE,  2001)& 
(CVE, 2001). 
Another buffer overflow in the BULK INSERT statement in the SQL Server (CVE-2002-
0641) allows transgressors with database administration privileges to execute arbitrary 
code via a long filename in the BULK INSERT query. On successful execution of this 
query, the transgressor will gain administrative privileges on the target host (CVE, 2002). 
The stack-based buffer overflow in Oracle Net Services for Oracle Database Server 9i 
release 2 (CVE-2003-0222) and earlier allows transgressors to execute arbitrary code via 
a “CREATE DATABASE LINK” query containing a connect string with a long USING  
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parameter. This flaw also allows low-privileged accounts such as SCOTT and ADAMS 
to create database links (CVE, 2003). 
 
 
Privilege Elevation via SQL Injection 
The  implications  of  SQL  injection  via  stored  procedures  is  very  high,  because  any 
component  that  dynamically  creates  and  executes  a  SQL  query  in  theory,  could  be 
subjected to SQL injection, but most organisations are not familiar with this type of threat 
because the most common form of SQL injection is targeted towards web applications 
(Litchfield et.el., 2005, p. 11). 
There  are  multiple  SQL  injection  vulnerabilities  (CVE-2004-1370)  in  the  PL/SQL 
procedures  that  run  with  definer  rights  in  Oracle  9i  and  10g,  which  allow  remote 
transgressors  to  execute  arbitrary  SQL  commands  and  gain  privillege  via 
DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION,  WK_ACL.GET_ACL,  WK_ACL.STORE_ACL, 
WK_ADM.COMPLETE_ACL_SNAPSHOT,WK_ACL.DELETE_ACLS_WITH_STAT
EMENT or DRILOAD.VALIDATE_STMT procedures (CVE, 2004). 
According to Litchfield (2005), in most other databases, the effect of SQL injection in 
stored procedures is less dramatic because the ‘definer rights’ in databases like Sybase 
and Microsoft SQL Server immediately back down to ‘invoker rights’ as soon as a stored 
procedure attempts to execute a dynamically created SQL statement. 
 
Local Privilege Elevation Issues 
This category is comprised of bugs that allow some level of privilege elevation at the 
operation system level. Most of the Oracle ‘extproc’ vulnerabilities and the entire class of 
privilege elevation from database to operating system users fall in this category. In SQL 
Server  and  Sybase`s  extended  stored  procedure  mechanism  e.g.  xp_cmdshell, 
xp_regread, MySQL`s UDF (User Defined Function) mechanism and LOAD extension in  
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PostgreSQL (CVE-2005-0227) allow non-privileged users to load arbitrary libraries and 
thereby execute initialization functions in those libraries (CVE, 2005). 
In Microsoft SQL Server 2000 SP2 (CVE-2002-0982), when configured as a distributor, 
allows  transgressors  to  execute  arbitrary  code  via  the  @scriptfile  parameter  to  the 
sp_MScopyscript stored procedure (CVE, 2002). 
In MySQL 3.23.55 (CVE-2003-0150) and world-writeable files and allows mysql users 
to gain root privileges by using the "SELECT * INFO OUTFILE" operator to overwrite a 
configuration  file  and  cause  mysql  to  run  as  root  upon  restart,  as  demonstrated  by 
modifying my.cnf (CVE, 2003). 
Apart  from  the  eight  common  vulnerabilities  as  discussed  above,  insecure  database 
configuration  is  another  vulnerability  that  cannot  be  overlooked  according  to  Clarke 
(2009). Most databases come with a number of default users preinstalled. Microsoft SQL 
Server  uses  ‘sa’  database  system  administrator  account,  MySQL  uses  the  “root”  and 
“anonymous” user accounts and with Oracle, the accounts SYS, SYSTEM, DBSNMP 
and OUTLN are often created by default when a database is created. These are only some 
of the more well-known accounts, there remain many others.  
According to Clarke (2009), most of these accounts are also preconfigured with default 
and well known passwords. Some system and database administrators install database 
servers to execute as root, SYSTEM or Administrator privileged system user’s account. 
Server services, especially database servers, should always be run as an unprivileged user 
in a “chroot” environment wherever possible to reduce potential damage to the operating 
system and other processes in the event of a successful attack against the database. This is 
not possible in some database such as Oracle on Windows environment as it must run 
with  SYSTEM  privileges.  Each  type  of  database  server  also  imposes  its  own  access 
control  model,  assigning  various  privileges  to  user  accounts  and  often  enabling,  by  
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default, functionality that is often surplus to requirements and can be leveraged by an 
transgressor. 
Finally, application developers  often code their applications  to  connect to  a database 
using one of the built-in privileged accounts, instead of creating specific user accounts for 
their application needs. These powerful accounts can perform a myriad of actions on the 
database that are extraneous to an application’s requirements (Clarke, 2009, p. 22). 
2.7  Challenges in Database Forensics 
In the recently held Black Hat USA, 2011 Conference, database security expert David 
Litchfield said that “Database Forensics is Still in Dark Ages” (Chickowski E. , 2011). 
The challenges in database forensics are many and according to researchers and computer 
forensic investigators, the lack of research and training in a forensic context (Garfinkel, 
2010, p. S64) is due to the complexity of databases that are not fully understood (Khanuja 
& Adane, 2012, p. 29).  
The challenges in database forensics are similar to that of cyber forensics with some key 
exceptions and are discussed below: 
 
Forensic Training and Education of the examiner:  
The forensic examiner dealing with databases needs to master the working of various 
database management systems and computer systems. This is a challenge because all 
these  systems  are  different  e.g.  Oracle,  Microsoft  SQL  Server,  MySQL  behave 
differently on various platforms such as Window, Linux and UNIX (Guimaraes, Austin, 
& Said, 2010, p. 62) and have different artifacts in terms of forensics (Finnigan, 2007, p. 
10), (Fowler, 2007, p. 8) & (Khanuja & Adane, 2012, pp. 36-38). 
 
Non-Availability of Tools:  
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Forensic Tools according to Oliver (2009) for conducting post-compromise analysis on 
databases  are  conspicuously  absent  from  a  forensics  specialist’s  toolkit.  Commercial 
tools  such  as  EnCase  Forensic  (Guidance  Software,  2012),  Forensic  Toolkit  (FTK) 
(AccessData,  2012)  scour  hard  drives  to  collect  evidence  (Gray,  2007),  but  are  not 
effective for database forensics (Khanuja & Adane, 2012, p. 174). 
Detection  and  evidence  of  transgressions  now  committed  in  virtual  and  volatile 
environments are confronted by existing forensics tools that have limited capability in 
recovering all the digital evidence (Miklau, Levine, & Stahlberg, 2007, p. 388) in terms 
of collecting evidence from these environments. 
 
Massive Data Collection and Analysis:  
Gray (2007) in his article “Owning Database Forensics” quotes David Litchfield who 
presented  at  the  AusCERT  Computer  Crime  Survey  proceeding  that  an  average 
individual user has the capacity to store up to 30 terabyte of data on home equipment 
alone, commercial databases host anywhere up to couple of petabytes of data.  
Acquiring and verifying an 80 GB hard disk would approximately take four hours and 
more, if the storage size were in petabytes, the time to acquire and verify all the data 
would increase exponentially (Carvey & Casey, 2009, p. 3)  
This growing size of storage makes it difficult to create a forensic image of a device and 
process  all of the data  within a speculated period of time (Garfinkel,  2010, p. S66). 
Moreover, the entire process of preserving, creating backups of large volumes of data 
hosted  on  databases  and  completing  forensic  analysis  becomes  a  costly  and  resource 
hungry operation (Eroraha, 2010). 
 
Sophisticated Database rootkits:  
Fowler (2009) describes rootkits as a single or a collection of applications that allow an 
individual to maintain “root” permission covertly within a computer system. Rootkits use  
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Ring 0 or kernel level privilege (Wang, Stavrou, & Ghosh, 2010, p. 162) that is used by 
the  operating  system  and  use  multiple  techniques  such  as  hiding  database  users, 
processes, jobs and database functions or by exploiting operating system vulnerabilities 
and object to disguise or modify data returned by the operating system functions (Fowler, 
2009, p. 357) (Kornbrust, 2005, p. 10) (SANS, 2012).  
Hypervisor  level  rootkits  create malicious  hypervisor by  exploiting  hardware features 
such as Intel VT or AMD-V (OmniSecu, 2012) and hide its existence from the operating 
system and the users by modifying a machine’s boot sequence and load as a hypervisor. 
These rootkits emulate virtual hardware for the operating system and cannot be detected 
from the compromised operating system (SANS, 2012). “Blue Pill” and “Sub Virt” are 
two such examples (Ou, 2006).  
Bootkits are boot level rootkits that attack full disk encryption and replace a legitimate 
boot loader with that of an adversary (OmniSecu, 2012) e.g. Evil Maid Attack and Stoned 
Bootkits (Schneier, 2009), and this activates the bootkit even before the operating system 
is started by executing its code residing in the master boot record (MBR) as soon as BIOS 
(Basic Input Output System) selects the appropriate boot device (Kaspersky Lab, 2012). 
Cold Boot, according to Schneier (2009) is another type of rootkit that attacks encryption 
keys of disk encryption and exploits the content of RAM (Eroraha, 2010).  
 
Collecting Volatile Data:  
 
Volatile information can defined as data that will cease to exist when the system  on 
which the data resides is powered off and usually exists in physical memory, or RAM 
(Random Access Memory) (Carvey & Casey, Window Forensic Analysis DVD Toolkit 
2E, 2009, p. 4). 
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Volatile data can be categorised as Tire 1 and Tire 2 Volatile Data. Tire 1 data contains 
critical system information such as logged in users, active network connections and the 
processes running on the system. Tire 2 data is less critical than Tier 1 and contains 
information such as scheduled tasks and clipboard contents (Aquilina, Casey, & Malin, 
2008, p. xxxiii). 
 
Volatile data is so fragile, changes will occur when the system is idle without any user 
interactions. Changes such as network connections timeout or new network connection 
being created, data being saved or deleted and running programs will change volatile 
data. This change process is called “Locard's Exchange Principle” and the changes that 
occur  to  a  system  as  the  system  itself  is  idle  is  referred  to  as  “evidence  dynamics” 
(Carvey & Casey, 2009, pp. 5-7). Understanding and documenting these changes and 
being able to explain the effects of these changes on the system are a critical challenge 
when dealing with forensic data that is volatile. 
 
Adhering  to  order  of  volatility  is  another  challenge  in  collecting  volatile  data,  as 
discussed above, some information may be more volatile than others e.g. Tire 1 data. A 
simple network timeout will trigger a change to the state of the volatile data such as 
registers, cache, touting table, arp cache, process table, kernels, memory etc. Therefore, 
adherence to the order of volatility when collection volatile data is critical (Brezinski & 
Killalea, 2002). 
 
Some of the other system constraints, such as ensuring integrity (using hash) of collected 
information, non-availability of standard tested tools to support various operating system 
environments,  lack  of  logging  and  tracking  capabilities  within  the  database  (Garcia, 
2006) are challenges encountered by a forensic examiner (Eroraha, 2010). 
 
Challenges posed by the existing legal systems:  
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Cyber forensics is a relatively new discipline to the courts and many of the existing laws 
used to prosecute computer related crimes, legal precedents and practices related to cyber 
forensics are in a state of flux, therefore it is very important for the forensic examiner to 
collect evidence in a way that is legally admissible in court. Forensic examiners should 
also be aware of privacy laws and country specific law imposed on data collection and 
retention for forensic purposes, violation of any one of these laws during practice of 
cyber forensics could constitute a federal felony (US-CERT, 2008, p. 3). 
Corporate  policies  and  procedures  regarding  proprietary  data  and  privacy  is  another 
challenge that may prevent an examiner from effectively performing forensic analysis 
(Eroraha, 2010, p. 38) & (Andress & Winterfeld, 2011, p. 22). 
2.8  Forensic Artifacts Contained in a Database 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines artifact as “An object that has been 
intentionally  made  or  produced  for  a  certain  purpose”  (Risto,  2011).  In  reference  to 
computers, artifacts can be but not limited to event logs, data files, executable modules, 
registry  values  and  settings  (Carvey  &  Casey,  2009,  pp.  3-47).  Similarly,  within 
databases, data cache holds recently access data from objects such as tables and indexes. 
SQL cache stores recently executed SQL statements and transaction log records change 
activity (Fowler, 2009, p. 67). 
The names of the data cache, SQL cache and transaction logs may vary between database 
management systems, but conceptually, they perform the same functions regardless of the 
database management system (Suffern, 2010, p. 68). 
 
Databases cache data pages in the data cache as they are requested from the disk; this is 
an area of memory that has been set aside for database usage and contains data that has 
been recently requested by users of the database. Therefore, the data cache may contain  
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data that has been exposed to the transgressor during a security incident. This cache is 
highly volatile and only preserved as long as space permits or until the database is shut 
down. As cache space runs low, older pages are removed to make room for new pages. 
Because of the high volatility of the data in the cache, it is to preserve this evidence first 
(Fowler, 2009, p. 67). 
 
Database cache executed SQL statements, as well as the access paths used to retrieve the 
data that was requested, is another area of memory called the SQL cache and this cache 
may  contain  SQL  statements  that  were  executed  by  the  transgressor.  This  volatile 
evidence is preserved as long as space permits or until the database is shut down. On 
most  database  management  systems  SQL  cache  can  be  manually  cleared  and  a 
transgressor  who  gains  administrator  privileges  on  the  database  may  clear  the  cache 
(Litchfield, et.el., 2005). 
 
The transaction log records activity that make changes to the database such as adding, 
updating or deleting data. Therefore the transaction log may contain changes made to the 
database by an transgressor. The transaction log is written to disk at regular intervals 
when a COMMIT command is executed. This is not volatile, however depending on the 
database configuration, older enteries in the log may be over written as space become 
low.  This  type  of  log  configuration  is  known  as  circular  logging  and  can  make  the 
transaction log somewhat volatile depending on the level of database activity. There is 
another  type  of  transaction  log  configuration  that  archives  old  transaction  logs  to  a 
separate area on the disk where they can be kept indefinitely, essentially creating non-
volatile evidence (Litchfield, et.el., 2005).   
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However, a forensic analyst cannot depend on archive logging being enabled because the 
method for viewing data in the data cache, SQL cache and transaction log vary from one 
database management system to another, as each will have its own proprietry format for 
the data (Suffern, 2010, p. 69). 
 
Other forensic artificats that may be useful during database forensic examinations include 
but are not limited to database statistics, schedules stored procedures, user authorisations 
and database log errors. Outside the database, useful artifacts are logs from operating 
systems, applications, configurations, web server and security softwares (Fowler, 2009, p. 
65). 
 
2.9  Summary 
The main objective of this literature review was to establish a theoretical framework for 
databases and its applications and understand how perpetuators of cybercrime exploited 
vulnerabilities in the database management system (DBMS). This literature review also 
defined  key  terms,  definitions  and  terminology,  and  identified  and  discussed  various 
database related incidents and how the compromised databases were exploited. Finally, 
the various security flaws, challenges and the forensic artifacts contained in a database 
was discussed. 
In course of this literature review, it became evident that humans are the weakest link in 
information security (Lineberry, 2007). The number one cause for data loss is human 
error, which includes, but is not limited to accidents, employee mistakes, and deliberate 
acts of espionage, trespass, sabotage and theft. Data loss by force of nature, technical 
hardware and software failure is very less (Whiteman, 2003, p. 93).  
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This literature review also highlights that database hacking is not the only way to lose 
data, the other forms of data loss are from physical loss in terms of lost, discarded or 
stolen  non-electronic  records  such  as  paper  documents  and  electronic  items  such  as 
mobile devices and portable devices. 
An effective remedy to this situation is to educate key and affected personnel and ensure 
they do not become a cause for data loss; this activity then becomes an  integral part of 
modern IT infrastructure planning.  
This literature review also highlighted the need for more in-depth research in the field of 
database forensics as the currently available data in context to forensic is very limited. 
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3  Forensic Examination Frameworks 
3.1  Overview 
DFRWS (Digital Forensic Research Workshop) is a non-profit organisation dedicated to 
sharing  knowledge  and  ideas  about  digital  forensic  research.  Since  the  first  digital 
forensics research workshop (DFRWS) in 2001, the need for a standard framework has 
been understood, and many researchers have proposed various frameworks and models to 
meet the changing requirements of digital examination. A sound comprehensive model 
must  provide  a  consistent  and  standardised  framework  that  supports  all  stages  of  an 
examination, both technical and non-technical, regardless of the specific type of crime. 
There are various and diverse digital forensic models and frameworks for driving digital 
examination processes as follows. 
3.2  Computer Forensic Investigative Process (CFIP) 
Pollitt  (1995)  proposed  the  CFIP  model  in  1984  for  dealing  with  digital  evidence 
examinations, so results would be scientifically reliable and legally acceptable. 
 
Figure 8: Computer Forensic Investigative Process (Pollitt M. M., 1995) 
The model has four phases as shown in Figure 8. In the acquisition phase, evidence is 
acquired  with  approval  from  authorities.  In  the  identification  phase,  the  digital 
components from the acquired evidence are converted to a human readable format (Pollitt 
M.  ,  1995).  The  evaluation  phase  comprises  of  the  task  to  determine  whether  the 
components  identified  in  the  previous  phase,  are  indeed  relevant  to  the  case  being  
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investigated and can be considered as legitimate evidence. In the final admission phase, 
the acquired & extracted evidence is presented in the court of law (Pollitt, 1995 & 2007). 
3.3  An event based digital investigation framework (EBDFIF) 
The  EBDIF  framework  was  proposed  by  (Carrier  and  Spafford,  2004)  based  on  the 
phases that are documented for investigating physical crime scenes (James & Nordby, 
2003; Lee, Palmbach, & Miller, 2001; Saferstein, 2000) has been refined over the years 
and accepted in many court cases. (Carrier and Spafford, 2004) used this framework to 
show that examining a computer is more similar to investigating a physical crime scene 
and includes clear goals for each phase. This Model has five distinct phases as shown in 
Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Five distinctive categories in the EBDFIF (Carrier & Spafford, 2004) 
The  readiness  category  includes  the  operational  readiness  phase  that  trains  the 
appropriate  people  and  tests  the  tools  that  will  be  used  to  investigate  a  system.  The 
infrastructure  readiness  phase  helps  in  configuring  the  equipment  to  make  sure  the 
needed data exists when an incident occurs (Carrier & Spafford, 2004, p. 5).  
The deployment category includes the detection and notification phase where the incident 
is detected by the victim or another third party and the examiners are alerted. 
In the confirmation and authorisation phase, examiner receive authorisation to conduct 
the examination (Carrier & Spafford, 2004, p. 5).  
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In the physical crime scene investigation Category, physical objects at the crime scene 
i.e. digital device, are examined and evidence is collected and the physical events are 
reconstructed.  If  any physical  objects  that may  have digital  evidence are found, then 
digital examination begins (Carrier & Spafford, 2004, p. 5). 
In  the  digital  crime  scene,  investigation  phase  the  digital  data  is  examined  and  the 
conclusion made will be used in the physical examination (Carrier & Spafford, 2004, p. 
5).  
The final  category is  the  presentation stage, where the theories developed and tested 
about the events related to the incident and the results will be presented to the corporate 
audience or court of law (Carrier & Spafford, 2004, p. 6). 
This model has most of the key components required for database forensics with the 
exception  of  crime  scene  survey,  shielding  communication,  obtaining  external 
authorisation, post examination data archiving and evidence return. 
 
3.4  The Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIPM) 
Baryamureeba and Tushabe (2006) proposed the Enhanced model based on the Integrated 
Digital Investigatoin Process model proposed by Carrier and Spafford (2004) and has five 
major phases as follows: 
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Figure 10: Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2006) 
-  Readiness  phase:  This  includes  operation  readiness  and  Infrastructure 
readiness. 
-  Deployment  phase:  This comprises of detection, notificaiton, confirmation, 
authorisation, physical and digitial crime scene examination and submission. 
It involves presenting the physical and digitial evidence to legal or corporate 
entities. 
-  Traceback phase: This involves tracking down the perpetrator`s crime scence 
operation  and  obtaining  authorisation  from  local  legal  entities  to  permit 
further investigation. 
-  Dynamite  phase:  The  primary  crime  scene  is  investigated  again  to  obtain 
further evidence and involves crime scene reconstruction and presentation in 
court. 
-  Review phase: The whole examination is reviewed and areas of improvements 
identified (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2006). 
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3.5  Forensic process model (FPM) 
The  U.S.  Department  of  Justice  published  the  FPM  model  in  the  publication  titled 
‘Electronic crime scene investigation: A guide to first responders’ (National Institute of 
Justice, 2008). This guide is oriented towards those who respond to the physical crime 
scene, so emphasis is placed on those requirements and little attention is paid to the 
analysis of the system (Carrier & Spafford, 2003). This model consists of five phases, 
namely  Preparation  phase,  Collection  Phase,  Examination  Phase,  Analysis  Phase  and 
Reporting Phase (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2006). 
 
-  In the preparation phase, the equipment and tools required for the examination are 
prepared (Carrier & Spafford, 2003). 
-  In the collection phase, the crime scene is secured to ensure the safety of the 
people  and  the  integrity  of  the  evidence.  The  evidence  is  then  searched, 
recognised, collected and documented (Carrier & Spafford, 2003). 
-  The examination phase is designed to facilitate the visibility of the evidence and 
explain  its  origin  and  significance,  this  phase  involves  revealing  hidden  and 
obscured information and the relevant documentation (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 
2006). 
-  In the analysis phase, the examination team reviews the examination results for 
their significance and value to the case. In the reporting phase observation are 
noted summarising the overall examination (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2006) & 
(Carrier & Spafford, 2003). 
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This process model is based on the standard physical crime scene investigation, but does 
not give much attention to the examination and analysis process and therefore does not 
directly meet the requirements of database forensics. In this model, the collection of a 
physical hard disk is considered as electronic evidence and it is not very clear to the 
examiner if the hard disk contains relevant electronic evidence or not. Following this 
method is not a very good practice because digital evidence is being collected without 
being examined (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2006) (Carrier & Spafford, 2003). 
 
 
3.6  The Abstract Digital Forensic Model (ADFM) 
The researchers at the U.S. Air Force proposed the ADFM model as shown in Figure 11, 
and identified common traits of various process models and incorporated them into an 
abstract model (Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002). 
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Figure 11: Abstract Digital Forensic Model (Yusoff, Roslan, & Zainuddin, 2011) 
This model does well at providing a general framework that can be applied to a range of 
incidents. It consists of nine components as follows (Carrier & Spafford, 2003): 
-  Stage1: Identification - Detect incidents or crime. 
-  Stage 2: Preparation - Prepare the tools and techniques and obtain required 
approvals. 
-  Stage 3: Approach Strategy - Develop a strategy to maximize the collection of 
evidence and minimize impact on the victim. 
-  Stage 4: Preservation - Isolate and secure physical and digital evidence. 
-  Stage 5: Collection - Record the physical crime scene and duplicate digital 
evidence. 
-  Stage 6: Examination - Search for evidence relating to the suspected crime. 
-  Stage 7: Analysis - Determine significance and draw conclusions based on the 
evidence found. 
-  Stage  8:  Presentation  -  Summarize  and  provide  an  explanation  of  the 
conclusion and theory. 
-  Stage 9: Return Evidence – Send evidence back to the owner. 
 
3.7  The Integrated Digital Investigation Model (IDIM) 
The IDIM as shown in Figure 12 is another model proposed by Carrier and Spafford 
(2004) (See An event based digital investigation framework (EBDFIF)) that has all the 
components  from  their  previous  model  (EBDFIF)  and  does  well  at  illustrating  the  
 
62 
 
forensic process and conforms to the cyber terrorism capabilities (National Institute of 
Justice, 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Integrated Digital Investigation Model (Yusoff, Roslan, & Zainuddin, 2011) 
This  model  also  addresses  data  protection,  data  acquisition,  imaging,  extracting, 
interrogation,  ingestion/normalization,  report  analysis  and  finally,  highlights  the 
reconstruction of the events that lead to the incident (Baryamureeba & Tushabe, 2006).  
However, according to Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2006) this model has some drawbacks 
in terms of practicality. This model depicts a deployment phase consisting of the incident 
as being independent of the physical and digital examination phase. In practice however, 
it is impossible to confirm a digital or computer crime unless some preliminary physical 
and digital examination is carried out. The second drawback is the lack of specificity in 
terms of distinguishing between examinations at the secondary and primary crime scene. 
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3.8  New Digital Forensic Investigation Procedure Model (NDFIPM) 
Yong-Dal  Shin  of  the  Dept.  of  IT  and  Cyber  Police,  Youngdong  University,  Korea 
proposed the NDFIPM model that has ten stages as shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: New Digital Forensic Investigation Procedure Model (Shin, 2008)  
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-  Stage 1: Investigation Preparation – The investigation starts at this phase with 
the team preparing infrastructure that can fully support the examination and 
ensuring  that  all  the  technical  staff  are  adequately  trained  to  handle  the 
examination.  
-  Stage 2: Classifying cybercrime and deciding examination priority – Crime 
classification and prioritization based on violence is completed at this stage.  
-  Stage 3: Investigating damaged digital crime scene  
-  Stage 4: Criminal profiling of consultant and analysis 
-  Stage 5: Tracking suspects 
-  Stage 6: Investigating injurer digital crime scene 
-  Stage 7: Summoning suspects 
-  Stage 8: Additional investigation 
-  Stage 9: Writing profile 
-  Stage 10: Writing report 
(Shin, 2008) 
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3.9  Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SDFIM) 
The SDFIM model was proposed by professors from Northern India Engineering College 
in 2011 (Agarwal, Gupta, Gupta, & Gupta, 2011), based on the model proposed by the 
Digital Forensics Research Workshop from 2001. It has eleven phases as shown in Figure 
14.  
 
Figure 14: Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (Agarwal, Gupta, Gupta, & Gupta, 2011) 
-  Phase 1 – Preparation 
-  Phase 2 – Securing the scene 
-  Phase 3 –Survey and recognition 
-  Phase 4 – Documenting the scene 
-  Phase 5 – Communication shielding  
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-  Phase 6 – Evidence collection 
-  Phase 7 – Preservation 
-  Phase 8 – Examination 
-  Phase 9 – Analysis 
-  Phase 10 – Presentation 
-  Phase 11 – Result & Review 
 
Name Assigning for Comparison: 
In  this  section,  each  model  that  is  being  compared  is  given  a  short  name  so  it  can 
conveniently fit in a table for ease of readability. Table 1 describes the model name and 
the assigned short name. 
 
Model Name  Short Name 
Abstracted Digital Forensic Model  ADFM 
Computer Forensic Investigative Process  CFIP 
Event Based Digital Forensic Investigation Framework  EBDFIF 
Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model  EDIPM 
Forensic Process Model  FPM 
Integrated Digital Investigation Model  IDIM 
New Digital Forensic Investigation Procedure Model  NDFIPM 
Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model  SDFIM 
 
Table 1: Assigning Short Name 
 
Table 2 is the comparison of various models discussed in Chapter 3. 
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3.10 Cyber Forensic Frameworks & Model Comparison 
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Table 2: Comparing Existing Cyber Forensic Frameworks  
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The benefit of comparing various frameworks is to understanding how they differ from 
each other and the various advantages of using any particular model or framework and its 
given effect in an examination. In this comparison, the key process involved in all the 
selected frameworks were identified, tabulated and compared (Table 1).The comparison 
in table 2 clearly shows that none of the existing frameworks have the same parameters in 
terms of the processes required to process a forensic analysis of database.  
The comparison highlighted that none of the compared frameworks state what they do 
with post examination data. Return of evidence is another parameter that is not discussed 
in  any  framework except  Abstracted Digital Forensic Model  (ADFM). Review of  an 
examination after case resolution provides valuable insights to the investigating team, in 
terms  of knowledge improvement  and  error correction. Unfortunately,  apart from the 
Enhanced  Digital  Investigation  Process  Model  (EDIPM)  and  the  Systematic  Digital 
Forensic Investigation Model (SDFIM), other existing frameworks do not address this 
aspect.  Final  Documentation  is  another  key  process  that  is  totally  ignored  by  most 
frameworks,  except  the  Event  Based  Digital  Forensic  Investigation  Framework 
(EBDFIF) and the New Digital Forensic Investigation Procedure Model (NDFIPM). 
Hypothesis  testing  is  the  rational  framework  for  applying  a  statistical  test  to  extract 
information and validate the significance of the sample data (Voelz, 2006, p. 2). None of 
the  selected  frameworks,  with  the  exception  of  Event  Based  Digital  Forensic 
Investigation Framework (EBDIFIF), validate hypothesis during forensic examination. 
Crime scene reconstruction is another important parameter that is not part of the selected 
frameworks,  except  the  Event  Based  Digital  Forensic  Investigation  Framework 
(EBDFIF) and Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIPM).  
Companies such as Telstra provide infrastructure to support internet services in Western 
Australia and it is therefore very important to obtain authorisation from such external 
agencies if the accused may have used their services to launch the attack. Obtaining  
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permission from third party organisations therefore becomes a critical aspect that should 
be part of any framework (Michaud, 2001, p. 2) (US-CERT, 2008, p. 3). Unfortunately, 
with the exception of Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model (EDIPM), none of 
the  other  frameworks  includes  this  parameter.  Obtaining  authorization  might  not  be 
required  in  most  cases,  but  it  is  still  an  important  aspect  that  needs  to  be  part  of  a 
framework. 
Involving external agents such as the Police, Service Providers and Auditors to help with 
the examination is another critical parameter that may be required in the course of an 
examination. With the exception of New Digital Forensic Investigation Process Model 
(NDFIPM), none of the other forensic frameworks includes this aspect as one of the 
parameters. 
Communication  shielding  is  a  process  of  preventing  important  information  i.e.  data 
leaking during an examination e.g. sharing information about the case with people not 
authorised or involved in the examination or placing important documents related to the 
case in a non-secure location etc. These important parameters are not part of any forensic 
frameworks except Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model (SDFIM). 
Summary  
This comparison clearly shows that none of the currently existing forensic frameworks 
has standard processes, which points to the fact that a new standard framework is needed 
to standardise forensic analysis in terms of databases.  
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4  A Generic Workflow for Database Forensics Examination 
4.1  Overview 
This chapter introduces the concept of building forensic computing capabilities within an 
organisation  and  discusses  requirement  analysis  and  the  proposed  database  forensic 
examination workflow. 
Legal proceedings are part of doing business for any organisation, and they can find 
themselves in contention with a regulatory authority over design and implementation of a 
technical  control  for  Health  Insurance  Portability  and  Accountability  Act  (HIPAA), 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) or Sarbanes-Oxley compliance. Others may file suit 
over the impact of an organization’s technology; or an organization may find itself in a 
criminal  proceeding  after  being  maliciously  attacked  (see  the  attack  against  Sony  in 
section 2.5). Even if an organisation is not directly targeted by litigation, it is very easy 
for it to find itself on the receiving end of subpoenas and discovery orders. As long as an 
organisation is going to do business with computers, they need to be able to deal with 
legal proceedings where computer data is involved (Curtin, 2008, p. 7). 
The process of building in-house forensic capability depends on many factors, such as the 
budget, digital forensic laboratory management, responsibilities of staff, allocations of 
duties, staff training and experience, staff and laboratory productivity and counseling. For 
the staff involved in digital forensics the entire process can be very stressful, particularly 
if material being scrutinised relates to serious or gruesome crimes or if pornography or 
pedophilia are involved. Some of the other parameters that need consideration are the 
organizations outsourcing policies, the use of external experts, accommodation, storage 
capabilities and procuring forensic software (Jones & Valli, 2009, pp. 28-36). 
Other  than  the  budgetary  restraint,  the  organisation  needs  to  justify  the  need  for 
developing  an  in-house  forensic  capability.  If  it  cannot  justify  the  need  for  such  
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capability, then it is advised that the organisation outsource this capability to a reliable 
third party specialising in providing a reliable service. 
Irrespective of the decision to develop forensic capability in-house, an organisation can 
have a brief understanding of the various processes involved in a forensic analysis of a 
database and this chapter discusses the same. 
4.2  Requirement Analysis 
The process of establishing the service and the constraints under which the proposed 
system must operate can be defined as requirement analysis (Sommerville, 1995, p. 64). 
The proposed system must provide a means of assisting a forensic examiner to prepare, 
investigate,  analyse,  document,  present  evidence  in  court  or  concern  authorities  and 
conduct post examination analysis in course of a forensic incident. 
This section articulates the set of functions the proposed system should do rather than 
how it is done. The various available features of the proposed system i.e. System specific 
requirements, functional requirements and non-functional requirements are discussed in 
this section. 
System Specific Requirements 
These requirements are specific to the generic workflow presented in this research and 
describe what the proposed system should do: 
-  R1.1: The system should aim to support the forensic examiner to determine what 
happened, why it happened and who is to blame for database incident.   
-  R1.2: The system should support the initiation of a pre-examination stage from a 
manual or automatic trigger.  
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-  R1.3: The system should integrate and support auditing every stages of evidence 
collection  to  establishing  chain  of  custody,  evidence  validity  and  forensic 
soundness. Audits should not alter original records (NIST, 2009, pp. F-27).  
-  R1.4:  The  system  should  support  a  forensic  examiner  to  collect  and  secure 
electronic evidence at all stages of the examination so that nothing in the original 
evidence is altered and the evidence should be legally admissible in Court of Law 
(US-CERT, 2008, p. 3). 
-  R1.5:  The  system  should  support  a  forensic  examiner  to  create  and  maintain 
custody logs with information as to who is accessing the evidence, the time date 
and purpose of such access and if the evidence is removed, the time and date of 
return  for  all  evidence  collected  during  the  examination  (Standards  Australia, 
2003, p. 23). 
-  R1.6:  The  system  should  support  and  guide  a  forensic  examiner  in  collecting 
evidence relevant to the incident, to avoid examiners from deviating from the 
actual incident. 
-  R1.7:  The system  should support the forensic examiner in  controlled decision 
making at every stage of the examination process.  
-  R1.8: The system should support the forensic examiner to upload digital evidence 
into the system at all stages of the examination.  
-  R1.9:  The  system  should  support  integrating  network  scanning  tools  such  as 
NMAP to scan user network for host discovery, operating system identification, 
device type identification and other services on the host network and capture data 
from the logs into the system.  
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-  R1.10: The system should enable a forensic examiner to view the status of an 
ongoing  examination  and  produce  status  reports  at  any  time  during  the 
examination. 
-  R1.11:  The  system  should  prompt  forensic  examiner  to  carry  out  critical 
operations  such  as  crime  scene  securing,  preservation,  obtaining  examination 
authorisation from internal and external stakeholders and record such actions. 
-  R1.12: The system should have communication shielding features that prevent 
unauthorised communication by a forensic examiner and other associated team 
members in accordance with the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 and 
Workplace Surveillance Act (NSW & VIC) (Standards Australia, 2003, p. 23). 
-  R1.13: In the event of volatile evidence collection, the system should prompt the 
forensic examiner to record evidence from process listing, service listing, system 
information,  logged  on  and  registered  users,  network  information  including 
listening ports, open ports, closing ports, ARP (address resolution protocol) cache, 
auto  start  information,  registry  information  and  binary  dump  of  memory.  The 
system should not permit the examiner to proceed with the examination until all 
the above information is recorded (7safe & ACPO, 2007, p. 18). 
-  R1.14: The system should advise and prompt the forensic examiner in relation to 
all evidence that  cannot be stored with  the native database such as  pedophile 
images and other evidence that is stored on devices that cannot be transferred into 
the database to be marked as restricted and stored in secure location to prevent 
evidence  contamination.  If  the  need  arises  to  transfer  these  images  during 
examination,  the  evidence  should  be  exhibited  on  an  encrypted  disk  that  is 
password protected (7safe & ACPO, 2007, p. 29).  
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-  R1.15:  The  system  should  permit  controlled  access  to  external  consulting 
examiners and other forensic contractors as such they should be able to only view 
information directly related to the case they are involved (7safe & ACPO, 2007, 
p. 33).  
-  R1.16: The database associated with the system should be patched and free of 
vulnerabilities as discussed in the literature review. 
-  R1.17:  The system  should  aid  a  forensic examiner to  reconstruct  crime scene 
based  on  evidence  collected.  This  is  a  very  critical  aspect  of  examination 
especially in cyber-crime because the mere presence of an object does not prove 
that the owner of the computer is responsible for putting the object in it. Apart 
from the owner, the system or an intruder can generate the object automatically or 
virus program can plant the object, or the previous owner of the computer can 
leave the object. It is therefore important for an examiner to reconstruct event in 
the past that caused the presence of the object to determine who is responsible for 
its creation (Gladyshev, 2004, p. 25). 
-  R1.18: The system should prompt the forensic examiner to identify non-readable 
electronic records such as slack space of a disk drive that may contain deleted 
files  or  encrypted  files  and  caution  against  altering  or  deleting  such  files  or 
records (Standards Australia, 2003, p. 23).  
-  R1.19:  The  system  should  have  the  ability  to  segregate  the  final  reports  into 
technical  and  legal  reports,  the  main  objective  in  segregating  reports  and 
converting electronic evidence into human readable format is to persuade decision 
makers such as management, lawyers, judges etc. of the validity of the facts and 
opinions deducted from the evidence (Standards Australia, 2003, p. 25).   
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-  R1.20: System should have the ability to function in the eventuality of server 
failure by having a load-balancing server or replicating server that can enhance 
and  improve  application  availability,  performance,  quality  of  service,  and 
examination continuity (Radharc, 2012, p. 7). 
Functional and Non-Functional Requirements 
Other than the system specific requirement, the proposed system should also meet the 
following generic functional and non-functional requirements. 
Functional Requirements 
Functional  requirements  capture  the  intended  behavior  of  the  system  and  may  be 
expressed as services, tasks or functions the system is required to perform (Bredemeyer 
& Bredemeyer, 2001). 
-  RF1.0: Authorised Access - The proposed system should only allow authorised 
users to access the system. A super user or administrator account has to be pre-
configured  during  system  development  that  can  manage  and  perform  various 
administrative tasks such as adding users, creating back up and running reports 
(International Council on Archives, 2008). 
-  RF1.1: Administration Functions - The proposed system should have the ability to 
perform  administration  functions  such  as  the  user  management  and  report 
generation. 
-  RF1.2: Interface - The proposed system should have simple web interface and 
navigation tools to interacting with the users. 
-  RF1.3:  Report Generation & Printing  - The proposed system  should have the 
ability to generate and print reports.  
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-  RF1.4: Support & Maintenance - The proposed system should have support and 
maintenance from the system developer or suitable technician. 
-  RF1.5: Business rules - The proposed system should have the ability to implement 
business conditions or constraints that define some or all aspect of the business 
that control or influence their behaviors (BRG, 2012).  
-  RF1.6: Easy to use - The proposed system should have simple web interface and 
navigation control buttons.  
-  RF1.7: Portability - The proposed system should be highly portable. 
-  RF1.8: Implementation - The proposed system should be easily implemented and 
should support multiple platforms.  
-  RF1.9: Adverse downtime - The proposed system should have 99.9 % uptime.  
-  RF1.10: Legal or Regulatory Requirements - The proposed systems should meet 
all the legal and regulatory requirements of the country or state. 
-  RF1.11: Error Handling - The proposed system should have the ability to handle 
system and hardware errors. 
-  RF1.12: Historical Data - The proposed system should have the ability to collect, 
manage and securely archive historical data (International Council on Archives, 
2008). 
Non-Functional Requirements 
Non-functional requirements are system qualities the proposed system should possess 
(Easterbrook, 2005). Notable requirements are:  
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-  RNF1.0:  Reliability  -  The  proposed  system  should  generate  accurate  and 
consistent report without errors from the database or web interface.  
-  RNF1.1:  Assurance  of  fault  tolerance  -  The  proposed  system  should  function 
without any faults or error after deployment. 
-  RNF1.2: Scalability - The proposed system should have the ability to expand data 
storage and system capabilities. 
-  RNF1.3: Security - The proposed system should not have any system, operating 
system and hardware vulnerabilities. 
-  RNF1.4: Personnel availability and Skill level - System usage training should be 
provided as part of deployment to the investigating team.  
-  RNF1.5: Maintainability - The proposed system should have regular maintenance 
from the system developer or suitable technician. 
-  RNF1.6:  Availability  -  The  availability  of  the  proposed  system  should  be 
appropriately high.   
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4.3  Pre-Examination Phase 
A database examination has two main phases (Figure 15). The first is the pre examination 
phase, where the database administrator attempts to preserve the crime scene and ensure 
that tampering of data does not occur as soon as an intrusion is detected. This phase prior 
to the actual examination can be classified as the passive phase and when the forensic 
examiner starts, the examination this phase becomes the active phase. 
 
Figure 15: Pre-Examination Phase 
The Pre-Examination Phase plays an important role in an examination. In this stage, a 
knowledgeable database administrator may have the insight to document all the activities 
related to the incident. This data can be very insightful to a forensic examiner. If this 
process is documented correctly, it will save valuable time and downtime cost, whereby a 
compromised  database  can  be  brought  back  to  production  with  little  downtime.  
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According to the research published by the Standish Group (Standish Group, 1999) the 
average cost of a minute downtime for ERP database is approximately $7,900, Supply 
Chain database is $6,600 and e-commerce database is $7,800 respectively. Many other 
applications have a much higher cost per-minute of downtime. Financial Markets, Credit 
Card  Sales,  Brokerage  firms  and  other  online  organisations  that  completely  rely  on 
databases for their day-to-day activities have reported their loss to be more than $100,000 
per minute when their trading systems go down (Burleson, 2007). 
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4.4  A Generic High Level Workflow for Database Forensic Examination 
The proposed framework consists of six distinct phases and at the completion of each 
phase, a report is generated that leads into the next phase. Figure 16 shows the overview 
of the workflow. 
 
Figure 16: A Generic High Level workflow for Database Forensic Examination 
The six different phases are as follows: 
-  Phase  1:  Incident  Reporting  Phase  –  In  this  phase  a  database  incident  is 
captured or recorded either through a user report, system audit, or triggered 
events. An initial report is prepared and the examination proceeds to the next 
phase - Phase 2.  
 
81 
 
-  Phase 2: Examination Preparation Phase – Based on the report generated in 
phase 1, decisions are made if network isolations or crime scene freezing is 
required, and various other tools are used to identify the type of database, the 
various  configurations,  and  policies  within  the  organisation  governing  the 
setup and maintenance of the database.  
Decision to proceed with dead (offline) or live (online) analysis, is also made 
at this stage. The findings are captured in a report and if the incident warrants 
further action the forensic examination proceeds to Phase 3, else, it goes to 
Phase 4 (Documentation& Presentation) and the examination is closed.  
-  Phase 3: Physical & Digital Examination Phase – During the physical and 
digital  examination  phase,  the  standard  process  and  procedures  of  already 
well-established methods of digital examination are followed and the resulting 
report is captured in the report and the examination proceeds to Phase 4. 
-  Phase  4:  Documentation  &  Presentation  Phase  –  Based  on  the  report 
generated from the previous processes, technical and legal reports are created 
and the reports are presented to the concerned authorities, and the examination 
moves to phase 5. 
-  Phase 5: Post Examination Phase – In this phase, post examination data is 
archived and evidence is returned, and at the completion of this phase, the 
examination moves to the last phase. 
-  Phase 6: Post Examination Analysis Phase – This phase is the analysis of 
system lessons learnt, application lessons learnt and policy lessons learnt and 
the  results  are  discussed  with  the  investigating  team.  Depending  on  the 
situation, the examination either proceeds to the incident-reporting phase or 
exits and the case is closed.   
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4.5  Phase 1: Incident Reporting Phase – Database 
This is the first phase of the examination where an incident related to the database is 
either captured or recorded as seen in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 17: Incident-Reporting Phase 
A database related incident is captured either by user reported events such as, but not 
limited to, the user`s failure to access the database, authentication failure or change and/ 
or loss of privileges recorded through a system audit based on logs or triggered events 
(Fowler, SQL Server Forensic Analysis, 2009, p. 50). 
A database can be audited based on database logon/logoff using database features or by 
setting up  an external  database security solution. Most database vendors support  this 
basic auditing function and the performance penalty is very little. The log for this event 
can also be setup in such a way that the login name and timestamp of the user, TCP/IP  
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address  of  the  client  initiating  the  connection  and  the  program  used  to  initiate  the 
connection, can also be logged (Natan, 2005, p. 354). 
Auditing  the  source  of  database  usage  is  related  to  login/logoff,  but  also  included 
information such as the network node, IP address and host names of the application and 
users connected to the database. The audit can also review logs from various other events 
such as, but not limited to, database usage outside normal operation hours, data definition 
language (DDL) activities, database errors, changes to the source of stored procedures 
and triggers, changes to user privileges, any changes made to the definition of what to 
audit, security attributes, changes or creating database links to applications, any changes 
to sensitive data such as user pay, student marks, bonus, employee appraisal, immigration 
data and any changes or execution of select statement for privacy sets (Natan, 2005, p. 
370). 
All the above information is captured in a report and based on the report the examination 
proceeds to the next phase- Phase 2. 
4.6  Phase 2: Examination Preparation Phase 
The examination preparation phase proceeds phase 1 and are dependent on the reports of 
phase 1. This phase has three parts as shown in figure 18.  
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Figure 18: Examination Preparation Phase 
In the first part, a decision is made to isolate the network, depending on the criticality of 
the incident. In the second part, Nmap is used to identify further the type of database and 
other configurations of the database. This data can be used to validate the data provided 
by the database administrator during the pre-examination phase. Finally, the decision to 
proceed with dead (offline) or live (online) examination is made based on the criticality 
of the incident and the effect has on the organisation. All the data collected is formulated 
into a report and a final  decision is  made  to  either proceed with  the  examination  or 
document the reason for the trigger and close the case. 
4.7  Phase 3: Physical & Digital Examination Phase 
The Physical & Digital examination phase begins with obtaining authorisation from the 
concerned authority to conduct examination on their premises. This phase has numerous 
established  and  published  guidelines  that  help  cyber  forensic  analysts  develop  crime  
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scene handling protocols to meet their specific needs. The U.S. Department of Justice 
(USDOJ) and U.S. Secret Service have developed guidelines such as Electronic Crime 
Scene  Investigation:  A  Guide  for  first  responders  and  Best  Practices  for  Seizing 
Electronic Evidence: A Pocket Guide for First Responders. These documents are useful 
for developing a standard procedure (SOP) and form the basis on which an examination 
can be customized to meet the requirements of that particular situation (Casey, 2011, p. 
230). 
Phase 3 has two distinct parts. Part 1 is the Physical Examination phase, as shown in 
Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Physical Examination Phase 
This deals with the physical aspect surrounding the crime scene. As the physical location 
may  contain  many  pieces  of  evidence,  it  is  therefore  necessary  to  apply  forensic 
principles to preserve survey and document the entire crime scene. It is also necessary to  
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search for non-computer evidence such as digital monitoring devices, access points and 
manual logs near the database location (Casey, 2011, p. 227).  
Once  this  phase  is  completed  the  data  obtained  is  captured  in  a  report  and  the 
examination moves to part 2 i.e. Digital Examination Phase as shown in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Digital Examination Phase 
 
 
The digital examination phase begins with preserving the digital crime scene and based 
on the reports obtained from phase 2, dead (offline) or live (online) analysis is processed. 
After  the  survey  is  completed  and  documented,  volatile  evidence  is  first  collected 
followed  by  non-volatile  evidence.  The  order  of  volatility  of  digital  evidence  is  as 
follows:  
-  CPU, cache and register content  
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-  Routing Table, ARP cache, process table, kernel statistics 
-  Memory 
-  Temporary file system / swap space 
-  Data on the hard disk 
-  Remotely logged data 
-  Data contained on the archived media 
Live data can also be collected remotely or locally using tools such as F-Response, Zero-
View etc. (Henry, 2009). 
After evidence collection, the data is analysed and evidence is validated based on the 
“interrogation process” based on the model proposed by Boddington, Hobbs, & Mann 
(2008)  and  the  entire  crime  scene  is  reconstructed  using  temporal  (when),  relational 
(who, what, where) and functional (how) analysis and a report is generated (Casey, 2011, 
p. 262). The examination then moves to phase 4. 
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4.8  Phase 4: Documentation and Presentation Phase 
In the documentation and presentation phase, as highlighted in Figure 21 all the reports 
are  collated  and  separated  into  technical  and  legal  reports.  This  is  presented  to  the 
concerned authority.  
 
 
Figure 21: Documentation and Presentation Phase 
After the presentation, the examination moves to Phase 5. 
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4.9  Phase 5: Post Examination Phase 
In the post examination phase, (Figure 22) data is securely archived. The equipment and 
evidence collected are returned to their respective owners. Once this phase is completed, 
the examination goes to its final phase. 
 
Figure 22: Post examination Phase 
 
4.10 Phase 6: Post Examination Analysis Phase 
This final phase (Figure 23) is completed in order to understand the various systems, 
applications and policy lessons learnt from the current examination and the necessary 
changes that need to be made for future examinations. This is a briefing of the entire 
examination  and  depending  on  the  situation;  the  examination  either  proceeds  to  the 
incident-reporting phase or exits and the case is closed.  
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Figure 23: Post Examination Analysis Phase 
4.11 Summary 
The  generic  workflow  of  database  forensic  examination  primary  combines  all  the 
important  processes  of  a  typical  digital  examination.  As  seen  in  the  comparison  of 
existing frameworks (in Table 2) none of the current frameworks have all the parameters 
that are required at this stage. With the onset of technological development to process a 
digital examination, there is a need to have a standard process that will handle most 
scenarios. This workflow is a step towards achieving that standard.  
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5  Evaluation 
5.1  Overview 
This chapter evaluates the workflow proposed in chapter 4 on qualitative and case study 
basis and aims to show that the proposed workflow can be applied to a real life database 
incident. Section 5.2 will presents the proposed system implementation plan, discuss the 
various stages of the examination in detail with flow charts, and design interface. Section 
5.3 and 5.4 will discuss the qualitative and case study based evaluation respectively, and 
then the proposed workflow will be compared against existing frameworks in section 5.5. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude by discussing the limitation of the proposed workflow 
in section 5.6. 
5.2  Implementation 
This  section  discusses  the  proposed  system  implementation,  deployment  overview, 
system lifecycle, system dataflow and system design interface. 
5.3  Deployment overview 
The deployment overview of the proposed system as seen in Figure 24 show a visual 
representation of the proposed system with load-balancing servers and MySQL database 
on the backend and a web browser as the front end that enables a forensic examiner to 
interact with the system.  
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Figure 24: Deployment Overview 
5.4  System Life Cycle 
The system life cycle as shown in Figure 25 is a flow chart that provides a snapshot of the 
systems behavior and the various processes at a glance. It starts when the examiner logs 
into the system and stops when the investigation is completed.   
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Figure 25: System Life Cycle  
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5.5  System Data Flow Diagram 
The proposed system data flow diagram as shown in Figure 26 is a visual representation 
of the data flow through the various stages of the application from the time an incident is 
created until the final technical and legal report creation. This diagram uses a technique 
called top-down expansion to conduct the analysis and provides a user with a clear and 
easy understanding of the flow of data and representation of application function (Kozar, 
1997). In this application, the data flow starts from the incident-reporting phase and ends 
with the generation of legal and technical reports. 
 
 
Figure 26: System Data Flow Diagram 
5.6  Hardware and Software Requirements 
The proposed system can be hosted on any modern hardware available in today’s market, 
but minimum requirement needs to be met in order to ensure faster processing, hardware  
 
95 
 
failure and other factors that might slow or stop a forensic examination (Canavan, 2011, 
p. 64).  
Some of the requirements in terms of hardware are a computer with dual or multiple-core 
CPU Server that runs  Microsoft  Windows  Server 2008 R2, four  gigabyte of random 
access memory (RAM), Dual Network interface cards (NICs), RAID 1 capability with 
three  drives  (one  serving  as  a  hot  spare),  Dual  power  supplies,  CD-ROM  drive  and 
Uninterruptible power supply (UPS).  
Some of the software requirements are Window 2008 Standard Server Operating System, 
HP  Data  protector  backup  agent,  XAMPP  cross  platform  webserver  solutions  stack 
consisting of Apache server, MySQL Database, and interpreters for scripts written in 
PHP  and  Perl  Programming  languages,  Heidi  SQL  tool  and  Navicat  for  MySQL  to 
manage MySQL Database and Internet Explorer or Firefox web browser. 
5.7  System Design Interface 
This section describes the various design interfaces available in the proposed system. An 
examiner can access the system via the login page as seen in Figure 27. A user with 
admin access can login to the system without having to register as a new user; all other 
users have to click on new user button and will be directed to the registration page as 
shown in Figure 28. 
Once the registration is complete, a user name and password will be generated and the 
user can proceed to the login page. Once the login in successful, the user will be directed 
to the user home page as shown in Figure 29. A user with admin access can click on the 
admin tab and will be taken to the admin home page as seen in Figure 30.  
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Figure 27: System login Page 
 
 
 
Figure 28: New Examiner Registration Page  
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Figure 30 is the examiner’s home page. In this page, an examiner can start a new case, 
view  cases  assigned  by  the  administrator,  resume  current  examination  and  generate 
report. This page also has a last login and IP address-tracking feature that will prevent 
misuse of the application and help in auditing. 
 
 
Figure 29: Examiner Home Page 
 
Figure  30  is  the  administrator’s  home  page;  it  has  the  same  features  as  that  of  an 
examiners home page, but with the exception of user management. This feature allows an 
administrator  to  approve  new  users  and  manage  current  examination.  The  admin 
dashboard  has  the  summary  of  all  the  current  cases,  the  status  and  the  case  officer 
investigating the case.  
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Figure 30: Admin Home Page 
 
Incident Reporting Phase: 
This is the first phase of the examination where a forensic examiner starts recording 
various details pertaining to the reported incident. This screen has four tabs each opening 
in its own window and the examiner can cycle through all the four tabs. Figure 31 to 
Figure 36 describe various options and features available in this phase.  
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Figure 31: Incident Reporting Phase 1 - Contact Details 
 
Figure 31 shows the contact detail page where the forensic examiner records the contact 
details of the person reporting the incident. The contact details include full name, e-mail 
address and phone number.  
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Figure 32: Incident-Reporting Phase 1 - Incident Type 
Figure 32 shows the options available for a forensic examiner to choose the incident type 
such as a user reported event or a system report. Then the examiner can choose the type 
of event such as but not limited to database access, authentication failure, changes and 
loss or gain in privilege. The examiner also has the ability to upload a user report. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
101 
 
 
Figure 33: Incidence Reporting Phase 1 - System Audit 
Figure 33 is the screen that allows a forensic examiner to record information triggered 
because of a system audit requiring examination. In this screen, the examiner has the 
options of recording the audit date and audit details such as but not limited to logon, 
logoff, source of database usage, usage outside normal operating hours, DDL activities, 
database errors etc. via a drop down list.  
The examiner can also upload a system audit report and any other information that needs 
to be recorded that does not fit in with the predefined fields in the system audit other 
field. 
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Figure 34: Incidence Reporting Phase 1 - System Details 
Figure  34  is  the  screen  that  records  the  details  of  the  compromised  system  and  the 
forensic examiner can record the location of the affected system, the database instance 
such as Oracle, Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL), MySQL, DB2, Informix, Sybase ASE, 
or PostgreSQL. 
The database version and the operating system on which the database is hosted such as 
Windows NT, 2000, 2003 or 2008, XP, Vista or Win 7 series or non-window platform 
such as Linux, UNIX or Solaris. 
The  examiner  can  also  record  the  host  platform  as  physical  device  or  a  virtual 
infrastructure. 
  
 
  
 
103 
 
 
Figure 35: Incidence Reporting Phase 1 - Network Details 
Figure 35 shows the screen that lets the forensic examiner records network details of an 
incident such as Hardware & Assets, connectivity of the system to the network, if the 
system is connected to another device, network address, MAC address, and the internet 
provider. The detail of the internet provider is required to get authorisation to investigate 
or  obtain  information,  if  their  network  was  used  as  a  part  of  the  attack  (Carrier  & 
Spafford, 2003, p. 7).  
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Figure 36: Incidence Reporting Phase 1 - Physical Security 
 
Figure 36 shows the screen that lets the forensic examiner record the physical security 
details  such as  locks,  alarm,  and  access  control at  the server room. This  screen  also 
permits the examiner to identify and records the primary function of the database. Some 
of the available options are banking, finance, human resource, testing, life support, power 
grid, hospital record management or any non-critical databases. The system also captures 
back up details. 
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Examination Preparation Phase: 
This is the second phase of the examination where a forensic examiner starts making 
important  decision  such  as  network  isolation,  scanning  network  to  identify  various 
database configurations, obtaining authorisation from relevant authorities both internal 
and external before starting the examination. This screen has four tabs each opening in its 
own window and the examiner can cycle through all the four tabs. Figure 38 describes 
various options and features available in this phase. All the four tabs have drop down 
lists, are similar to each other, and permit the examiner to choose the appropriate action 
in a given situation. In the network isolation tab the examiner can record if the crime 
scene  needs  freezing,  internet  disconnection  or  local  network  disconnection.  In  the 
network scan tab, the examiner can record if all the required network details have been 
captured. In the authorisation tab the examiner can record if the entire required internal 
and external authorisation has been obtained.  
 
 
Figure 37: Incidence Preparation - Network Isolation  
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Physical & Digital Examination Phase: 
This is the third phase of the examination where the forensic examiner performs physical 
and digital examination according to industry standard and uploads the results into the 
application. This screen has four tabs, each opening in its own window and the examiner 
can  cycle  through  all  the  four  tabs.  Figure  38  describe  various  options  and  features 
available in the physical examination phase. All four tabs, namely preservation, survey, 
search & collect and reconstruction, have the same features. The examiner first performs 
the task and then uploads the report into the application.  
 
 
 
Figure 38: Physical Examination Phase 
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Figure 39: Digital Examination Phase 
 
Figure  39  describes  various  options  and  features  available  in  the  digital  examination 
phase.  The  interface  is  similar  to  physical  examination  phase  with  the  exception  of 
validation tab. The examiner first performs the task and then uploads the report into the 
application.  
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Documentation & Presentation Phase: 
This is the fourth phase of the examination where reports are generated and the case is 
reviewed before being presented to the concerned authorities. Figure 40 describes the 
various options available in this phase. This screen has three tabs each opening in its own 
window and the examiner can cycle through all the three tabs. The report generation tab 
allows an examiner to select a case and generate a technical or legal report. The update 
case tab permits the examiner to update any missing details of the examination and the 
review tab has the summary of the entire case. 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Documentation & Presentation Phase  
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Post Examination Phase: 
This  is  the  fifth  phase  of  the  examination  where  examination  data  is  archived  and 
evidence returned. Figure 41 describes the various options available in this phase. This 
screen has three tabs each opening in its own window and the examiner can cycle through 
all the three tabs.  
In the data-archiving tab, the examiner can select the relevant case and upload details of 
data archiving. The evidence-returning phase has similar interface as data archiving and 
the examiner can upload details of evidence returned to the client. In the review case tab 
the examiner can review the entire case up to its present status.  
 
 
 
Figure 41: Post Examination Phase 
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Post Examination Analysis Phase: 
This is the final phase of the examination where the examiner and the client analyse the 
case for system, application and policy lesson learnt. Figure 42 describes the various 
options  available  in  this  phase.  This  screen  has  three  tabs  each  opening  in  its  own 
window providing the same interface and function and the examiner can cycle through all 
the three tabs. 
In the system lesson tab, the examiner can select the case and upload the system lesson 
learnt. The application and policy lesson tab has the same feature and once this process is 
completed, the case is closed. 
 
 
Figure 42: Post Examination Analysis 
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5.8  Qualitative Evaluation 
System Specific Requirements 
-  R1.1: The system captures and records evidence and other examination details in 
MySQL database and generates reports after every stage of the examination. This 
aids the forensic examiner to determine what happened, why it happened and who 
is to blame for database incident/s.   
-  R1.2: If the system is integrated into an organisation’s local network, then this 
system will support the initiation of a pre-examination stage from a manual or 
automatic trigger. A stand-alone system that is not connected to the organisation’s 
local network will not support this feature.  
-  R1.3: The system currently only permits user with administrative access to audit 
the various stages of evidence collection and currently does not have features that 
will enable external auditors to audit the chain of custody, evidence validity or 
forensic soundness.  
-  R1.4:  The  system  currently  permits  a  forensic  examiner  to  collect  and  secure 
electronic  evidence  at  all  stages  of  the  examination  and  prevents  the  original 
evidence from being altered, so the evidence can be admissible in court of law. 
-  R1.5: The system has features that permit the forensic examiner to create and 
maintain custody logs with information of evidence management. This includes 
any  personnel  accessing  the  evidence;  the  time,  date  and  the  purpose  of  that 
access and any removal of evidence. 
-  R1.6: The system has the capability to guide the forensic examiner in collecting 
evidence relevant to the incident, thereby preventing examiners from deviating 
from the actual incident.  
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-  R1.7:  The  report  generated  by  the  system  at  every  stage  provides  a  forensic 
examiner  with  information  relevant  to  the  case,  letting  them  take  controlled 
decision.  
-  R1.8: The system supports the forensic examiner to upload digital evidence into 
the system at all stages of the examination.    
-  R1.9: The system currently does not support integration of network scanning tools 
such as NMAP but a forensic examiner can upload data from tools such as NMAP 
into the application. 
-  R1.10: The system provides the forensic examiner with a dashboard that has the 
status of an ongoing examination and has the option to produce status reports at 
any time during the examination. 
-  R1.11: The system prompts the forensic examiner to carry out critical operations 
such as crime scene securing, preservation, obtaining examination authorisation 
from internal and external stakeholders and records such action. 
-  R1.12: The system has application authentication and separation of duty but does 
not have communication shielding features, which is more of a human  factor. 
Unfortunately, at this stage there is no guarantee about the system’s ability to 
prevent unauthorised communication by a forensic examiner and other associated 
team members. 
-  R1.13:  The  system  has  the  ability  to  prompt  the  forensic  examiner  to  record 
evidence from various such as process listing, service listing, system information, 
logged on and registered users;  network information including  listening  ports, 
open  ports,  closing  ports,  ARP  (address  resolution  protocol)  cache,  auto  start 
information,  registry  information  and  binary  dump  of  memory.  Pre-validation  
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steps will not permit the examiner to proceed with the examination until all the 
above information is recorded. 
-  R1.14: The system has the ability to advise and prompt the forensic examiner in 
relation  to  all  evidence  that  cannot  be  stored  with  the  native  database.  For 
example, pedophile images and other evidence stored on devices that cannot be 
transferred into the database have to be marked as restricted and stored in secure 
location to prevent evidence contamination. If the need arises to transfer these 
images during examination, the evidence should be exhibited on encrypted disk 
that is password controlled. 
-  R1.15: The system permits controlled access to external consulting examiners and 
other forensic contractors and they can only view information related to the case 
they are involved. 
-  R1.16:  The  database  associated  with  the  system  is  patched  and  free  of 
vulnerabilities as discussed in the literature review. 
-  R1.17: The system generates reports after every stage that makes it easy for a 
forensic examiner to reconstruct crime scene based on evidence collected. The 
system as such does not have the ability to reconstruct any crime. 
-  R1.18:  The  system  prompts  the  forensic  examiner  to  identify  non-readable 
electronic records from slack space of a disk drive that may contain deleted files 
or encrypted files and cautions against altering or deleting such files or records. 
-  R1.19: The system has the ability to segregate the final reports into technical and 
legal reports.  
-  R1.20:  System  is  set  up  with  load  balancing  server  and  provides  application 
availability, performance, quality of service, and examination continuity.  
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Analysis of Functional Requirements 
-  RF1.0: Authorised Access - The proposed system allows two types of authorised 
user’s i.e. admin and user. The admin account is predefined when setting up the 
system and has the ability to override most functions within the applications. The 
admin account also has the ability to assign cases and grant access to new users 
(International Council on Archives, 2008). 
-  RF1.1:  Administration  Functions  -  The  proposed  system  has  limited 
administration functions such as the user management and report generation. 
-  RF1.2: Interface - The proposed system uses simple web interface and navigation 
tools to interacting with the users. 
-  RF1.3: Report Generation & Printing - This is one of the key requirements of the 
proposed system and the system has the ability to generate and print reports. 
-  RF1.4:  Support  &  Maintenance  –  The  developer  provides  support  and 
maintenance to the proposed system. 
-  RF1.5: Business rules - These are guidance in the form of statements, conditions 
or constraints that define some or all aspect of the business. It is intended to assert 
business structure and to influence the behavior of the business (BRG, 2012). At 
this stage the proposed system does not have any business rule frameworks such 
as  Microsoft  BizTalk  Server  embedded  within  the  application,  but  use  paper 
based decision trees and tables to create business specific rules (Levin, 2008) that 
are manually implemented in the MySQL Database.  
-  RF1.6:  Easy  to  use  -  The  system  has  a  simple  web  interface  and  navigation 
control buttons. Drop down lists have been implemented to lets the user choose all  
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available options. Check boxes, radio buttons and submit buttons are embedded 
within the web form for every action, and it is quite easy to use. 
-  RF1.7:  Portability  –  The  design  of  the  proposed  system  permits  central 
deployment  or  deployment  on  a  portable  device  depending  on  the  need  and 
requirement of the organisation.  
-  RF1.8: Implementation - The proposed system has been designed and developed 
on a single device and has not been tested on other devices at this stage.  
-  RF1.9: Adverse downtime - Mechanical failure is a primary concern with the 
proposed application. At this stage, all possible precaution has been taken in terms 
of hardware and software to minimise the downtime, but it cannot guarantee 99.9 
% uptime in terms of hardware faults.  
-  RF1.10: Legal or Regulatory requirements - This application depends on the user 
to  follow  the  current  privacy,  data  retention  and  archiving  laws;  as  such  the 
application does not have any built in feature that will automatically do this. 
-  RF1.11: Error Handling - Error with this application will be handled on a case-to-
case  basis;  currently  there  is  no  mechanism  within  the  application  that  will 
automatically capture or manage errors. 
-  RF1.12: Historical Data - Historic data collected from evidence will be returned 
to the customers after the case is closed. All data associated with the case will be 
deleted with the exception of such data that needs to be permanently archived for 
legal purposed and will be securely archived (International Council on Archives, 
2008). 
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Analysis of Non-Functional Requirements 
-  RNF1.0:  Reliability  - The proposed application aims  to  generate accurate and 
consistent reports without error from the database or web interface. 
-  RNF1.1: Assurance of fault tolerance - The proposed application did not show 
any error after deployment. 
-  RNF1.2: Scalability - The scalability of the proposed applications has not been 
tested at this stage, but the design parameter has scope for expanding at a later 
date. 
-  RNF1.3: Security - The proposed application has been developed and deployed on 
a machine that has BIOS password, hard disk encryption, and operating systems 
password. Firewall and antivirus have ben enabled and configured. The default 
password  for  MySQL  database  and  Apache  webserver  has  been  changed.  All 
possible vulnerabilities within the application environment has been checked and 
patched. 
-  RNF1.4: Personnel availability and Skill level - The proposed application has a 
simple & easy to use web interface, but this does not guarantee that the forensic 
examiner will have the capability to use the application without prior training, 
therefore training is recommended prior to use. 
-  RNF1.5: Maintainability - The application developer will aim to provide as much 
maintenance and support as possible. 
-   RNF1.6: Availability - The proposed application aims to be available most of the 
time, but due to technical constraints such as limited hardware availability, this 
feature cannot be guaranteed. 
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5.9  Case Study based Evaluation 
Overview 
In this section, the workflow is applied to two database related incidence to verify and 
validate the applicability of the workflow to a real-life database incident. Two different 
scenarios were chosen, to test and identify the various advantages and disadvantages of 
the workflow.  
For the forensic workflow to be successful, it has to meet all the requirements of a real 
life  scenario.  It  should  aid  the  forensic  examiner  to  identify  when  the  database  was 
breached, how often the database was breached and the time of occurrence. 
The workflow should help the forensic examiner to identify the system vulnerability that 
was exploited to compromise the database, the location of the intrusion, the method used 
to overcome the security barrier and the evidence left behind after the incident.  
The workflow should also assist the forensic examiner to substantiate if the identified 
transgressor was responsible for the event or if it was a system/non-human error. The 
workflow should also aid the forensic examiner to prevent evidence purporting from a 
forensic and legal point of view.  
Evidence  validity  is  the  ability  of  a  forensic  analyst  to  verify  the  correctness  of  the 
evidence  in  context  of  cyber  forensics  and  is  a  fundamental  aspect  of  any  forensic 
examination.  By  using the  forensic  workflow, a forensic  examiner should  be able to 
establish the validity, non-ambiguity and relevance of the digital evidence (Boddington, 
Hobbs, & Mann, 2008). The workflow should also act as a forensic case management 
tool that will aid the forensic examiner to apply established standards and procedures to 
identify  best-case  result  by  systematically,  thoroughly  and  efficiently  collecting  and 
validating digital evidence. 
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Case 01: Barracuda Network Database Attack 
Overview 
Barracuda  Network  Inc.  is  a  well-established  vendor  offering  products  that  protect 
organisations from internet related threats and other networking products such as firewall, 
spam and virus firewall, web application firewall, load balancer and backup (Barracuda 
Networks, 2012).  
The purpose of  using  this  example is  to  evaluate the proposed workflow application 
against  the  database  breach  that  occurred  with  Barracuda  by  applying  the  various 
examination  phases  to  identify  the  various  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the 
workflow. 
Summary of the attack 
Barracuda  Networks  was  hit  by  SQL  injection  incident  on  9
th  April  2011,  when  the 
company`s  web  application  firewall  was  offline  for  scheduled  maintenance  (Rashid, 
2011). However, according to security analyst reviewing the incident, the vulnerabilities 
exploited in this incident are Blind SQL Injection, Web Application Firewall Breach and 
cracking of hashed and salting hashed passwords (Pullicino, 2012). 
Evaluation:  
Overview:  This  section  describes  the  application  of  the  proposed  workflow  to  the 
barracuda network database. The workflow consists of a pre-examination phase and six 
examination phases that guide the forensic examiner throughout the examination.  
Pre-Examination Phase: This is the phase prior to the actual examination where the 
forensic examiner analyses the preparedness of the breached client. In this example, the 
forensic examiner identifies that the Barracuda network had an established process for 
log collection (Perone, 2011) and all the log files from the attack are uploaded into the 
application for analysis.   
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Incident Reporting Phase: Barracuda Networks came to know of this breach in a public 
disclosure (Higgins, 2011). Unfortunately, their system did not trigger any alert therefore; 
the forensic examiner completes this stage by filling in the appropriate form (Third Party 
Reported Event) and moves to the next phase. 
Examination Preparation Stage: In this stage, the forensic examiner takes decisions 
regarding  network  isolation;  identify  various  types  of  database  configurations  and 
policies within the system. Decisions are made if the examination is a dead (offline) or 
live (online) basis. All the logs pertaining to perimeter security is be uploaded into the 
application and the report generated from this stage shows that the firewall was running 
in passive mode when the intrusion occurred.  
Since this is no longer an active intrusion and all the required logs are available, there is 
no  need  for  network  isolation  or  dead  (offline)  analysis  for  forensic  purposes.  The 
examination logs are uploaded onto the application and reports generated. Based on the 
report,  the  forensic  examiner  decides  to  proceed  with  the  examination  after  getting 
required internal approvals. 
Physical & Digital Examination Phase: In this stage all the physical & digital evidence 
are collected using industry standard for forensic analysis. All the details of the evidence 
are uploaded on to the application and report is generated. 
Documentation & Presentation Phase: The reports generated from the previous three 
phases are consolidated and the case is analysed. All the evidence from the incidence 
indicates Barracuda Networks web application firewall was running in passive mode. The 
comparison of Barracuda Network Incident shown in Figure 43, depicts a general process 
where a web application firewall blocks a SQL Injection attack on the web application 
server and consequently the SQL database. When the web application firewall is removed 
or is in passive mode, the web application server is exposed to vulnerabilities such as 
SQL injection attacks. In the instance of Barracuda Networks, the transgressors exploited  
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this lapse in security by identifying SQL injection vulnerability in a PHP script what was 
used to list customer reference, case studies. The breach was large enough to give hackers 
access to other databases on the same system (Pullicino, 2012). 
 
 
 
Figure 43: Comparison of Barracuda Network Database Incident with that of a Normal Process 
 
The Barracuda Network page with vulnerable PHP script as seen in Figure 44 shows the 
webpage with the vulnerable URL, where a single parameter called “v” is passed into this 
module.  By  changing  the  value  of  “v”,  hackers  were  able  to  inject  their  own  SQL  
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command into the system and read out the entire set of database on the server (Pullicino, 
2012). 
 
 
Figure 44: Barracuda Network Page with vulnerable PHP Script (Pullicino, 2012). 
The hackers compromised 22 different databases; some of the live production databases 
include “phpmyadmin”, “php_live_chat”, “information_schema”, “bware” and “blackip”. 
Some  of  the  development  databases  include  “igivetest”,  “igivetestsucks”,  “and 
dev_new_barracuda” and “new_baraccuda_archive”. The hackers gained access to more 
than 251 user names and passwords from a table called CMS_LOGINS for the Barracuda 
content  management  system  which  contained  hashed  password  using  MD5  algorithm 
(Figure 45) (Pullicino, 2012). 
  
 
 
 
Figure 45: MD5 hashed password (Pullicino, 2012). 
The hackers also managed to gain access to another MySQL database that contained 23 
user accounts that had system-level privileges. Some of the users accounts were tied  
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down to a particular server and some had grant access to all servers on the network. 
Figure 46 shows the user details, password and host details that were obtained from the 
compromised database. 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Hashed User Details (Pullicino, 2012). 
Finally, after the entire case was analysed, technical and legal reports were generated and 
the incident was presented to the appropriate authorities. 
Post Examination Phase: In this phase, all the evidence is securely archived in case it is 
needed  at  a  later  stage.  Returning  evidence  is  not  applicable  in  this  situation  as  the 
examination was done in-house. 
Post Examination Analysis Phase: In this phase, the forensic investigating team and the 
company IT staff sit together and discuss the various systems, application and policy  
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lesson learnt. Some of the more notable lessons learnt in relation to Barracuda network 
case are: 
System Lesson Learnt 
-  Enable and regularly examine event logs. 
-  Patch and harden databases (Chickowski E. , 2012). 
Application Lesson Learnt: 
-  Never disable Application firewall. 
-  Employ tools to check configuration of Host (U.S.DoD, 1998). 
-  Encrypt and salt usernames and passwords (U.S.DoD, 1998). 
-  Limit database privileges (Chickowski E. , 2012).  
Policy Lesson Learnt: 
-  Have a password policy that does not allow guessable passwords, reuse of 
passwords, have complex passwords then needs to be changed frequently and 
enforce them through software (Pullicino, 2012). 
-  Enforce clean desk policy that prevents  users  from  leaving passwords  and 
other personal credentials visible. This will enable the organisation to be ISO 
27001/17799  compliant  and  ensure  safekeeping  of  personal  information 
(Privacy Sence, 2011). 
-  Create firewall policy that specifies how firewalls should handle inbound and 
outbound network traffic (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009, pp. ES-2). 
-  Create policy for firewall administrations, management and separation of duty 
in terms of application control (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009, pp. 5-4). 
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Overview: 
The six phases of the workflow was successfully applied in this case and the forensic 
examiner was able to identify SQL Injection and passive firewall as the reason for the 
breach. It also identified 22 databases that were compromised during the incident. With 
the  report  generated  from  the  workflow,  the  forensic  examiner  was  also  able  to 
recommend measures to prevent such incidents in future. 
Case 02: Sony Data Breach 
Overview 
Sony Corporation is a leading manufacturer of electronic products for consumers and 
professional market. 
The purpose of using this  example is  to  evaluate the proposed workflow against the 
database breach that occurred at Sony Corporation by applying the various examination 
phases to verify the applicability of the forensic workflow and identify its positive and 
negative effects is relation to resolving database related incidents. 
Summary of the attack  
Sony Corporation was hit by hackers between 17
th and 19
th of April 2011 (Ogg, 2011) 
and stole account information of about 77 million users on its PlayStation network (PSN) 
and Qriocity services. A week later Sony Online Entertainment gaming service was also 
breached,  affecting  24.6  million  users.  The  hackers  stole  data;  notably  client  names, 
addresses, e-mail addresses, data of birth and credit card information (Rashid, 2011). 
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Evaluation 
Overview: This section describes the application of the proposed workflow to the Sony 
Corporation database breach. The workflow consists of a pre-examination phase and six 
examination phases that guide the forensic examiner throughout the examination. 
Pre-Examination Phase: This is the phase prior to the examination phase where the 
forensic examiner analyses the preparedness of the breached client. In this example, the 
forensic examiner identified Sony Corporation unpreparedness  to handle  this  massive 
situation. Sony did not have trained in-house staff or forensic capabilities. Most of its 
network  engineers  did  not  know  the  extent  of  the  breach,  and  what  systems  were 
breached (Schwartz, 2011). Sony did not  have/maintain application logging (Vijayan, 
2011) because of which the examiners had to start from the basics - first by identifying all 
the compromised servers and then systematically analysing each of them for evidence; 
unlike the barracuda network where the in-house team had proper log management.  
Incident Reporting Phase: Sony learnt about the breach from its Sony Entertainment 
America team, who noticed several PSN servers in the San Diego, California data center 
rebooting when they were not scheduled to reboot (Miller, 2011). Unfortunately, Sony 
did not have any trigging mechanism nor did it have a in-house forensics capability to 
respond  to  such  incidents  (Schwartz,  2011).  Therefore,  the  forensic  examiner  would 
complete this stage by filling in the third party reported event form and records details of 
the four servers that went offline and moves to the next phase (Miller, 2011). 
Examination  Preparation  Stage:  In  this  stage,  the  forensic  examiner  has  to  make 
decisions regarding network isolation, identify various types of databases, configurations 
and policies within the system. The decision also has to be made if the examination is a 
dead (offline) or live (Online) examination. Since Sony did not have any logs and it was 
becoming evident that more servers might have been compromised; hence this becomes 
an active intrusion. The network had to be isolated and live analysis had to be done on the  
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compromised servers. The forensic examiner isolated and disconnected the compromised 
network and mirrored all the compromised servers before the examination (Miller, 2011).  
This entire process was documented and the information uploaded onto the application. 
Based  on  the  report  generated  the  forensic  examiner  decided  to  proceed  with  the 
examination after getting required internal approvals. 
Physical & Digital Examination Phase: In this stage all the physical & digital evidence 
are collected using industry standard for forensic analysis. All the details of the evidence 
are uploaded on to the application and report is generated. 
Documentation and Presentation Phase: The reports generated from the previous three 
phases  are  consolidated and the case is  analysed.  All  the evidence from  the incident 
indicates Sony did not use any firewall to protect its network and its PSN (Play Station 
Network) servers. They were also using obsolete versions of Apache Web Servers with 
no patches applied on their entire PlayStation network (Rashid, 2011). 
The intrusion route to the Sony system as seen in Figure 47 details the path taken by the 
hackers to compromise the database.  
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Figure 47: Intrusion route to the Sony System (Rothacker, 2011) 
The hackers exploited the arbitrary code execution in Intrinsic SQL element database 
vulnerability discussed in section 2.6. It is evident that the transgressors were able to 
completely bypass all of the firewalls or lack of it and directly attack the database servers. 
The  hackers  accomplished  this  by  bypassing  the  application  and  perimeter  network 
protection and then installed a communication tool inside the network and attacked the 
database (Rothacker, 2011).  
Finally, after the entire case was analysed, technical and legal reports were generated and 
the incident was presented to the appropriate authorities. 
Post Examination Phase: In this phase, all the evidence is securely archived, in case it is 
needed  at  a  later  stage.  Returning  evidence  is  not  applicable  in  this  situation  as  the 
examination was done in-house.  
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Post Examination Analysis Phase: In this phase, the forensic investigating team and the 
company IT staff sit together and discuss the various systems, application and policy 
lesson learnt. Some of the notable lessons learnt in relation to Sony data breach are: 
System Lesson Learnt 
-  Install web application firewall for all applications. 
Application Lesson Learnt: 
-  Install and apply current patches on all web applications. 
-  Employ tools to check configuration of Host (U.S.DoD, 1998). 
-  Encrypt and salt usernames and passwords (U.S.DoD, 1998). 
-  Enable application logging (Vijayan, 2011). 
Policy Lesson Learnt: 
-  Create firewall policy that specifies how firewalls should handle inbound and 
outbound network traffic (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009, pp. ES-2). 
-  Create policy for firewall administrations, management and separation of duty 
in terms of application control (Scarfone & Hoffman, 2009, pp. 5-4). 
Overview: 
The six phases of the workflow were successfully applied to the database breach incident 
at Sony Corporation. The forensic examiners were able to identify the lack of firewall 
and the obsolete version of web application server was the primary reason for the breach. 
Approximately, ten or more databases were compromised during the attack. With the 
report generated from the workflow, the forensic examiner was also able to recommend 
measures to prevent such incidents in future. 
  
 
129 
 
Summary: 
The objective of evaluating both the case studies was to verify the applicability of the 
proposed workflow against the database incident that occurred at Barracuda Networks 
and Sony Corporation. It was also able to identify the various advantages and limitation 
of the workflow. 
The forensic examiner was not able to identify and locate the database breached in the 
pre-examination phase because of the lack of firewall and log management with Sony 
Corporation. Unlike in the case of Barracuda network where the logs were available and 
examiners were able to identify the vulnerability. Therefore, with Sony Corporation the 
entire workflow had to be applied in a systematic manner to identify who caused the 
breach, the processes involved in the breach, and what the transgressors accomplished. 
The six phases of the workflow were successfully applied to both the database breaches. 
The  forensic  examiners  were  able  to  identify  the  vulnerabilities  that  led  to  the 
compromise of the database. With the report generated from the workflow, the forensic 
examiner was also able to recommend measures to prevent such incidents. 
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5.10 Name Assigning for Comparison 
In this section, each model that is being compared is given a short name so it can easily 
fit in a table. Table 1 describes the model name and the assigned short name. 
 
Model Name  Short Name 
Abstracted Digital Forensic Model  ADFM 
Computer Forensic Investigative Process  CFIP 
Event Based Digital Forensic Investigation Framework  EBDFIF 
Enhanced Digital Investigation Process Model  EDIPM 
Forensic Process Model  FPM 
Integrated Digital Investigation Model  IDIM 
New Digital Forensic Investigation Procedure Model  NDFIPM 
Systematic Digital Forensic Investigation Model  SDFIM 
Proposed Workflow  PW 
 
Table 3: Assigning Short Name 
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  Comparison of the proposed workflow with other Forensic Examination Frameworks 
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Table 4: Comparison of the proposed workflow with other cyber forensic frameworks 
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The comparison as seen in Table 4 clearly indicates that the proposed workflow has filled 
the gap that exists in the current frameworks by including parameters that are essential to 
establish and create a systematic approach to conduct database related examination. The 
workflow  also  ensures  the  integrity  of  the  evidence  and  meets  the  current  legal 
requirements. 
5.11 Limitation of the Proposed Workflow 
This section describes the limitation of the proposed workflow as follows:  
-  Limited  availability  of  forensic  practitioners  with  knowledge  of  database 
forensics in Western Australia, limited time duration of the degree period, 
confidentiality  issues  along  with  existing  company  policies  of  consulting 
corporate  and  law  enforcement  practitioners  were  some  of  the  key  issues 
faced during the design and development of this workflow.   
-  Database administrators that were contacted had limited knowledge regarding 
forensic  analysis  of  database,  and  most  relied  on  third  party  vendors  to 
manage this function. 
-  Budget Constraints: This project did not have any funding approval from the 
university  or  other  organisations  that  prevented  procuring  commercial 
products such as Microsoft or Oracle database that have a stable built and 
vulnerability for backend testing. 
-  In-House Support and Maintenance: The proposed application does not have 
any  support  and  maintenance  other  than  that  provided  by  the  application 
developer. 
-  Assurance of Fault Tolerance: Fault Tolerance cannot be assured at this stage 
of  the  application  development,  but  this  can  be  incorporated  into  the  
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application at  future time after more testing  on various other development 
platforms. 
-  Web Deployment: The proposed application is designed for local deployment 
only;  as  such,  if  web  deployment  is  required  then  design  modification  is 
required.  
-  Remote  Access:  The  proposed  application  does  not  have  the  capacity  and 
ability for remote access at this stage. 
-  Limited  Administration  Capability:  The  proposed  application  has  limited 
administration  capability  and  only  permits  report  generation  and  user 
management. 
-  The proposed system does not support automatic data collection from open 
source tools that use scripting languages such as Perl, VB Scripts, Batch Files 
and Shell Scripts. 
-  End User Training: The proposed application does not have a schedule for end 
user training at this stage of the product development. 
-  This system cannot be deployed on mobile and other portable devices at this 
stage.  
 
5.12 Summary 
This chapter evaluated the workflow that was proposed in chapter 4 on qualitative and 
case  study  basis  and  showed  that  the  proposed  workflow  can  be  applied  to  real  life 
database incidents. Section 5.2 provided a detailed discussion of the proposed system 
implementation with flow charts and visually captivation design interface. In section, 5.3 
and 5.4 the workflow was evaluated on qualitative and case study basis. Section 5.5  
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compared the proposed workflow against existing frameworks and identified its various 
advantages. Finally, the chapter concluded by highlighting the various limitations of the 
proposed workflow.    
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6  Conclusions 
6.1  Overview 
This chapter presents the conclusion of the thesis. Section 6.2 contains an overview of the 
thesis. The major contributions of this research are discussed in section 6.3. Then section 
6.4  discusses  potential  future  work  and  finally  section  6.5  presents  some  concluding 
remarks.  
6.2  Overview of Thesis 
This research has described and evaluated a forensic workflow for database analysis. 
Chapter  1  introduced  the  concept  of  database  forensics  and  highlighted  the  fact  that 
database forensics is an emerging subdivision of cyber forensics. The currently available 
frameworks  and  models  take  a  generic  approach  in  dealing  with  computer  -  related 
incidence and looks at unstructured data. It does not have the flexibility to apply the same 
principle on a structured data in a database. 
Chapter 2 presented a review of the overall database concept and discussed the various 
database  applications  and  its  users.  The  history  of  database  evolution,  database 
architecture and various components  of database management systems  (DBMS)  were 
discussed in detail. This chapter then presented the various advantages and disadvantages 
of database management systems and then discussed cyber forensics and its development 
history.  It  also presents  the various database related incidents of the last  decade and 
discussed various database security flaws, challenges in database forensics; challenges 
posed by the existing legal system and finally discussed the various artifacts contained in 
the database.  
This  literature  review  established  a  theoretical  framework  for  databases  and  its 
applications and understood how perpetuators of cybercrime exploited vulnerabilities in 
the database management system (DBMS). From this literature review, it was evident  
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that more in-depth research in the field of database forensics is needed, as the currently 
available data in context to database forensics is very limited. 
Chapter 3 presented the importance of having a standard forensic framework that meets 
the changing requirements of digital examination. Eight forensic frameworks proposed 
by various experts in the forensic field were discussed in detail and then the frameworks 
were compared to understand how they differ from each other. The various advantages of 
using any particular model or framework and its given effect on a digital examination 
were discussed.  
Chapter 4 presented the concept of building forensic computing capabilities within an 
organisation and defined requirements of the proposed application. It then discussed the 
functional  and  non-functional  requirements  of  the  application.  After  the  requirement 
analysis,  the  forensic  workflow  was  introduced  with  the  brief  overview  of  the  pre 
examination stage and importance of documenting all activities related to an incident. 
Then the generic high-level workflow for database forensic examination was discussed 
followed by detailed discussion of all the six different phases of the workflow.  
Chapter 5 presented the evaluation of the workflow that was proposed in chapter 4 on 
qualitative  and  case  study  basis  and  showed  that  the  proposed  workflow  can  be 
successfully applied to real life database incidents. This chapter also provided a detailed 
discussion  of  the  proposed  system  implementation  with  flow  charts  and  visually 
captivation  design  interfaces.  After  the  workflow  was  successfully  evaluated  on 
qualitative and case study basis, it was compared against existing frameworks and its 
various advantages were identified. Finally, the chapter concluded by highlighting the 
various limitations of the proposed workflow. 
Finally, chapter 6 highlights the major results of this research presented in this thesis and 
discusses the potential future direction for this work.  
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6.3  Major Contributions 
A Comprehensive Literature Review of Database Forensics and its Challenges 
A  major  contribution  of  this  research  is  the  literature  review  that  collates  relevant 
database  forensic  publications  to  assist  the  reader  in  understanding  the  complexity 
involved in database forensics. The existing literature in the field of database forensics is 
written at a practical level, aimed at database administrators, but does not attempt to 
focus on the underlying theory, nor presents a generic model, but offer only a case-to-
case basis of issue resolution. This literature review highlights the need for more in-depth 
research in the field of database forensics and points out that the currently available data 
in context to forensic is very limited. 
The Design of a Generic Workflow to Support Forensic Database Analysis 
This  research  has  presented  the  design  of  a  generic  workflow  of  database  forensic 
examination that combines all the important processes of a typical digital examination. 
As seen in the comparison of existing frameworks (in Table 2-2) none of the current 
framework  has  all  the  parameters  that  are  required  at  this  stage.  With  the  onset  of 
technological development to process a digital examination, there is a need to have a 
standard  process  that  will  handle  most  scenarios.  This  workflow  is  a  step  towards 
achieving that standard. 
Evaluation of a Generic Workflow to Support Forensic Database Analysis 
This  research  has  presented  a  comprehensive  and  detailed  qualitative  and  case  study 
based  evaluation  and  verified  that  the  six  phases  of  the  workflow  was  successfully 
applied  to  real-life  database  incidents.  The  evaluation  also  identified  the  various 
limitations and drawback of the workflow that suggests more work is needed in this field.  
 
138 
 
6.4  Suggestions for Future Work 
As discusses in this research, database forensics is still in its infancy and needs a lot of 
scholarly research to achieve foolproof results in database forensic. This research is an 
attempt to achieve such standard by introducing a systematic way of gathering evidence 
that can be proved in court. It also needs more work in terms of technology integration 
and automation that was out of scope at the time of commencement of this research. 
Integrating NMAP for network inventory, exploration and automating network data and 
evidence  collection  is  another  important  aspect  that  will  reduce  human  error  in  this 
delicate process of database forensics. 
Web deployment with commercial database and less vulnerable web server would give 
this application a wider audience and would let the forensic examiner use this application 
anywhere in the world. 
6.5  Concluding Remarks 
In summary, I have proposed a system that allows a forensic examiner to focus on what is 
relevant to the case in a systematic way that can be proved in court. The workflow also 
generates reports at the end of every phase and aids the forensic examiner in deciding on 
critical aspects of the examination. The workflow also acts as a case management tool by 
aiding the forensic examiner to apply established standards and procedures to identify 
best-case result by systematically, thoroughly and efficiently collecting and validating 
digital evidence. Finally, the workflow also has the option to audits the work of the 
forensic examiner for legal compliance and meeting forensic standards. 
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Appendix A  Vulnerability Detail2 
CAN-2002-0649: Multiple buffer overflows in the Resolution Service for Microsoft SQL 
Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine 2000 (MSDE) allow remote transgressors to 
cause a denial of service or execute arbitrary code via UDP packets to port 1434 in which 
(1) a 0x04 byte that causes the SQL Monitor thread to generate a long registry key name, 
or  (2)  a  0x08  byte  with  a  long  string  causes  heap  corruption,  as  exploited  by  the 
Slammer/Sapphire worm. 
CAN-2002-1123:  Buffer  overflow  in  the  authentication  function  for  Microsoft  SQL 
Server 2000 and Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 allows remote transgressors to 
execute arbitrary code via a long request to TCP port 1433, aka the "Hello" overflow. 
CAN-2004-1363: Buffer overflow in extproc in Oracle 10g allows remote transgressors 
to  execute  arbitrary  code  via  environment  variables  in  the  library  name,  which  are 
expanded after the length check is performed. 
CAN-2003-0634: Stack-based buffer overflow in the PL/SQL EXTPROC functionality 
for Oracle9i Database  Release 2 and 1, and Oracle 8i,  allows authenticated database 
users, and arbitrary database users in some cases, to execute arbitrary code via a long 
library name. 
CAN-2003-0095: Buffer overflow in ORACLE.EXE for Oracle Database Server 9i, 8i, 
8.1.7, and 8.0.6 allows remote transgressors to execute arbitrary code via a long username 
that is provided during login, as exploitable through client applications that perform their 
own authentication, as demonstrated using LOADPSP. 
                                                 
2See: http://www.cvedetails.com/  
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CAN-2004-0795:  DB2  8.1  remote  command  server  (DB2RCMD.EXE)  executes  the 
db2rcmdc.exe program as the db2admin administrator, which allows local users to gain 
privileges via the DB2REMOTECMD named pipe. 
CVE-2000-0981: MySQL Database Engine uses a weak authentication method which 
leaks information that could be used by a remote transgressor to recover the password. 
CVE-2004-0627: The check_scramble_323 function in MySQL 4.1.x before 4.1.3, and 
5.0, allows remote transgressors to bypass authentication via a zero-length scrambled 
string. 
CVE-2002-0567:  Oracle  8i  and  9i  with  PL/SQL  package  for  External  Procedures 
(EXTPROC) allows remote transgressors to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary 
functions by using the TNS Listener to directly connect to the EXTPROC process. 
CVE-2004-1365: Extproc in Oracle 9i and 10g does not require authentication to load a 
library or execute a function, which allows local users to execute arbitrary commands as 
the Oracle user. 
CVE-2002-0624: Buffer overflow in the password encryption function of Microsoft SQL 
Server 2000, including Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000, allows 
remote transgressors to gain control of the database and execute arbitrary code via SQL 
Server Authentication, aka "Unchecked Buffer in Password Encryption Procedure." 
CVE-2001-0542:  Buffer  overflows  in  Microsoft  SQL  Server  7.0  and  2000  allow 
transgressors with access to SQL Server to execute arbitrary code through the functions 
(1) raiserror, (2) formatmessage, or (3) xp_sprintf. NOTE: the C runtime format string 
vulnerability reported in MS01-060 is identified by CVE-2001-0879.  
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CVE-2000-1084:  The  xp_updatecolvbm  function  in  SQL  Server  and  Microsoft  SQL 
Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly restrict the length of a buffer before 
calling  the  srv_paraminfo  function  in  the  SQL  Server  API  for  Extended  Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows an transgressor to cause a denial of service or execute 
arbitrary  commands,  aka  the  "Extended  Stored  Procedure  Parameter  Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
CVE-2000-1086: The xp_printstatements function in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and 
SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly restrict the length of a buffer 
before calling the srv_paraminfo function in the SQL Server API for Extended Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows an transgressor to cause a denial of service or execute 
arbitrary  commands,  aka  the  "Extended  Stored  Procedure  Parameter  Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
CVE-2000-1087: The xp_proxiedmetadata function in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and 
SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly restrict the length of a buffer 
before calling the srv_paraminfo function in the SQL Server API for Extended Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows an transgressor to cause a denial of service or execute 
arbitrary  commands,  aka  the  "Extended  Stored  Procedure  Parameter  Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
CVE-2000-1088: The xp_SetSQLSecurity function in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 and 
SQL Server Desktop Engine (MSDE) does not properly restrict the length of a buffer 
before calling the srv_paraminfo function in the SQL Server API for Extended Stored 
Procedures (XP), which allows a transgressor to cause a denial of service or execute  
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arbitrary  commands,  aka  the  "Extended  Stored  Procedure  Parameter  Parsing" 
vulnerability. 
CVE-2002-0641:  Buffer  overflow  in  bulk  insert  procedure  of  Microsoft  SQL  Server 
2000,  including  Microsoft  SQL  Server  Desktop  Engine  (MSDE)  2000,  allows 
transgressors with database administration privileges to execute arbitrary code via a long 
filename in the BULK INSERT query. 
CVE-2003-0222:  Stack-based  buffer  overflow  in  Oracle  Net  Services  for  Oracle 
Database Server 9i release 2 and earlier allows transgressors to execute arbitrary code via 
a "CREATE DATABASE LINK" query containing a connect string with a long USING 
parameter. 
CVE-2004-1370: Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in PL/SQL procedures that run 
with definer rights in Oracle 9i and 10g allow remote transgressors to execute arbitrary 
SQL commands and gain privileges via  
(1) DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION,  
(2) WK_ACL.GET_ACL,  
(3) WK_ACL.STORE_ACL,  
(4) WK_ADM.COMPLETE_ACL_SNAPSHOT,  
(5) WK_ACL.DELETE_ACLS_WITH_STATEMENT, or  
(6) DRILOAD.VALIDATE_STMT. 
CVE-2005-0227:PostgreSQL (pgsql) 7.4.x, 7.2.x, and other versions allow local users to 
load arbitrary shared libraries and execute code via the LOAD extension.  
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CVE-2002-0982:  Microsoft  SQL  Server  2000  SP2,  when  configured  as  a  distributor, 
allows  transgressors  to  execute  arbitrary  code  via  the  @scriptfile  parameter  to  the 
sp_MScopyscript stored procedure.   
CVE-2003-0150: MySQL 3.23.55 and earlier creates world-writeable files and allows 
mysql users to gain root privileges by using the "SELECT * INFO OUTFILE" operator 
to  overwrite  a  configuration  file  and  cause  mysql  to  run  as  root  upon  restart,  as 
demonstrated by modifying my.cnf.  
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Appendix B  Online tools and Resources3 
 
The  following  list  provides  examples  of  online  resources  that  might  be  helpful  in 
establishing a forensic capability. 
Organisations Supporting Forensics: 
Organisations  URL 
The  Association  of  Digital  Forensics, 
Security and Law (ADFSL) 
http://www.adfsl.org/ 
Australian  Information  Security 
Association (AISA) 
http://www.aisa.org.au/ 
Australian Computer Society  http://www.acs.org.au/ 
American Academy of Forensic Science 
(AAFS) 
http://www.aafs.org/ 
Computer  Crime  &  Intellectual 
Property  Section  (CCIPS)  US  Dept.  of 
Justice 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/index.html 
CERT Australia  http://www.cert.gov.au/ 
CERT  Carnegie  Mellon  Software 
Engineering Institute 
http://www.cert.org/ 
                                                 
3The applications referenced in this table are by no means a complete list of applications to use for forensic 
purpose, nor does this work imply any endorsement for certain product and by no means are the links 
absolute.   
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Digital Forensic Association  http://www.digitalforensicsassociation.org/ 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)  http://www.fbi.gov/ 
Federal  Law  Enforcement  Training 
Center (FLETC) 
http://www.fletc.gov/ 
International  Association  of  Computer 
Investigative Specialists (IACIS) 
https://www.iacis.com/ 
 
Technical Resource Sites: 
Resource Name  URL 
Computer Crime Research 
Center 
http://www.crime-research.org/ 
Computer  Forensic  Links 
compiled by Dave Dittrich 
http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/ 
Oracle  Forensic  and 
Database Security by David 
Litchfield  
http://www.davidlitchfield.com/security.htm 
SQL  Server  Forensic  by 
Kevvie Fowler 
http://www.applicationforensics.com/ 
National  Software 
Reference Library 
http://www.nsrl.nist.gov/  
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SANS Institute  http://www.sans.org/ 
Computer  Forensic 
Training Center Online 
http://www.cftco.com/ 
Oracle  Forensics  in  a 
Nutshell by Paul M Wright 
http://www.oracleforensics.com/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2007/03/OracleForensicsInANutshell.pdf 
 
Websites with Forensic Software Listing: 
Software Type  Website Name  URL 
Intrusion  Detection, 
Honeypots  and  Incident 
Handling Resources 
Honeypots.net  http://www.honeypots.net/ids/products/ 
Network  Packet  Sniffer 
and protocol Analyzer 
Packet Storm  http://packetstormsecurity.org/files/tags/
sniffer/ 
Network  Protocol 
Analyzer 
Softpedia  http://www.softpedia.com/get/Network-
Tools/Protocol-Analyzers-Sniffers/ 
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Appendix C  Database Creation Code 
# -------------------------------------------------------- 
# Host:                         127.0.0.1 
# Server version:               5.5.8 
# Server OS:                    Win32 
# HeidiSQL version:             6.0.0.3603 
# Date/time:                    2012-02-13 05:08:55 
# -------------------------------------------------------- 
 
/*!40101 SET 
@OLD_CHARACTER_SET_CLIENT=@@CHARACTER_SET_CLIENT */; 
/*!40101 SET NAMES utf8 */; 
/*!40014 SET @OLD_FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS=@@FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS, 
FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS=0 */; 
/*!40101 SET @OLD_SQL_MODE=@@SQL_MODE, 
SQL_MODE='NO_AUTO_VALUE_ON_ZERO' */; 
 
# Dumping database structure for dbworkflow 
CREATE DATABASE IF NOT EXISTS `dbworkflow` /*!40100 DEFAULT 
CHARACTER SET latin1 */; 
USE `dbworkflow`; 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.di_preservation 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `di_preservation` ( 
  `DI_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` date NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`DI_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_di_preservation_di_reconstruction` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `di_reconstruction` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 1 part of 
Digital Examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.di_reconstruction  
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `di_reconstruction` ( 
  `Direconst_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`Direconst_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_di_reconstruction_di_search_collect` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `di_search_collect` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 ROW_FORMAT=COMPACT 
COMMENT='This is the 4 part of Digital Examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.di_search_collect 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `di_search_collect` ( 
  `DIsearch_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`DIsearch_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_di_search_collect_di_survey` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `di_survey` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 ROW_FORMAT=COMPACT 
COMMENT='This is the 3 part of Digital Examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.di_survey 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `di_survey` ( 
  `DiSurvey_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`DiSurvey_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_di_survey_ip_authorisation` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `ip_authorisation` (`Case No`)  
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) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 2 part of 
Digital Examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ip_authorisation 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ip_authorisation` ( 
  `IpAUTH_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Internal_Auth` varchar(500) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `External_Auth` varchar(500) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `Other_Auth` varchar(500) DEFAULT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`IpAUTH_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_ip_authorisation_ip_networkscan` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `ip_networkscan` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 3 part of 
Examination Prepration Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ip_networkscan 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ip_networkscan` ( 
  `IPNetScan_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT '0', 
  `OpenPorts` varchar(300) NOT NULL DEFAULT '0', 
  `Topology` varchar(300) NOT NULL DEFAULT '0', 
  `HostDetails` varchar(300) NOT NULL DEFAULT '0', 
  PRIMARY KEY (`IPNetScan_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_ip_networkscan_ip_network_isolation` FOREIGN KEY (`Case 
No`) REFERENCES `ip_network_isolation` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 2 part of 
Examination Prepration Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ip_network_isolation 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ip_network_isolation` (  
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  `ip_Net_ISOl_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `crimeScenFrez` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `InternetDisc` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `LocalNetDisc` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `OtherDetails` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`ip_Net_ISOl_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 1 part of 
Examination Prepration Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ir_incidence_reporting 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ir_incidence_reporting` ( 
  `ir_incidenceRep_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `First_Name` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Last_Name` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Email_Id` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Telephone_No` int(15) NOT NULL, 
  `Other_Contact` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Incidence_Report_Date` date NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`ir_incidenceRep_ID`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='Captures Contact 
details of the person reporting incident'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ir_incident_type 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ir_incident_type` ( 
  `Incidence_ID` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Incidence_Date` date NOT NULL, 
  `Event_Type` char(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'User Reported Event\r\nSystem 
Audit\r\nOther', 
  `User_Event_Type` char(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Authentication 
Failure\r\nPrevilege', 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`Incidence_ID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`),  
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  CONSTRAINT `FK_ir_incident_type_ir_network` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `ir_network` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='Records Incident 
Type'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ir_network 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ir_network` ( 
  `ir_networkID` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `System_Connection` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `System_Device` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `System_Network_add` varchar(300) NOT NULL, 
  `MAC_Add` varchar(300) NOT NULL, 
  `Internet_Provider` varchar(300) NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`ir_networkID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 5 part of 
Incident Reporting Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ir_physicalsec 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ir_physicalsec` ( 
  `ir_PhysicalS` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Locks` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `SecurityAlarm` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `AccessControl` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  `DB_Function` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Banking\r\nFinance\r\nHospital', 
  `Backup` varchar(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Yes\r\nNo', 
  PRIMARY KEY (`ir_PhysicalS`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 6 part of 
Incident Reporting Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
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# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ir_system_audit 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ir_system_audit` ( 
  `ir_sysaudID` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Audit_Date` date NOT NULL, 
  `Audit_Detail` char(50) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Source of DBA Usage\r\nDDL 
Activity\r\nDatabase Error', 
  `System_Audit_Upload` longtext, 
  `Sys_audit_other` varchar(300) DEFAULT NULL 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 3 part of 
Incident Reporting Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.ir_system_det 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `ir_system_det` ( 
  `ir_sys_id` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  ` No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Location` varchar(100) NOT NULL, 
  `db_Instance` varchar(100) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Oracle\r\nMySQL\r\nMSSql', 
  `db_Version` varchar(100) NOT NULL, 
  `o_System` varchar(100) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Win 2008 Server\r\nWin 2003 
Server', 
  `Hosted_Plat` varchar(100) NOT NULL DEFAULT 'Virtual\r\nPhysical', 
  PRIMARY KEY (`ir_sys_id`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 4 part of 
Incident Reporting Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.pi_preservation 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `pi_preservation` ( 
  `pi_presID` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` date NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`pi_presID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`),  
 
154 
 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_pi_preservation_pi_reconstruction` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `pi_reconstruction` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 1 part of 
Physical Examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.pi_reconstruction 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `pi_reconstruction` ( 
  `pi_const` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`pi_const`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_pi_reconstruction_pi_search_collect` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `pi_search_collect` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 ROW_FORMAT=COMPACT 
COMMENT='This is 4 part of physical examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.pi_search_collect 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `pi_search_collect` ( 
  `pi_searchC` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`pi_searchC`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_pi_search_collect_pi_survey` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `pi_survey` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 ROW_FORMAT=COMPACT 
COMMENT='This is 3 part of physical examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.pi_survey 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `pi_survey` (  
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  `pi_surveyID` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Upload_Report` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Report_Date` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`pi_surveyID`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_pi_survey_post_ipanalyse` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `post_ipanalyse` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is 2 part of 
physical examination Phase'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.post_ipanalyse 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `post_ipanalyse` ( 
  `post_ipAnalyz` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `System_data` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Application_data` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Policy_data` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`post_ipAnalyz`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_post_ipanalyse_post_ipdata` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `post_ipdata` (`Case No`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is Post invest 
analysis'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.post_ipdata 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `post_ipdata` ( 
  `post_ipdata` int(10) NOT NULL, 
  `Case No` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `Data_Arch` longtext NOT NULL, 
  `Evidence_ret` longtext NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`post_ipdata`), 
  UNIQUE KEY `Case No` (`Case No`), 
  CONSTRAINT `FK_post_ipdata_post_ipanalyse` FOREIGN KEY (`Case No`) 
REFERENCES `post_ipanalyse` (`Case No`)  
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) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='This is the 1 part of 
post examination phase '; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
 
 
# Dumping structure for table dbworkflow.user_auth 
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS `user_auth` ( 
  `User_ID` int(10) NOT NULL AUTO_INCREMENT, 
  `User_Name` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `User_Password` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `User_Role` varchar(12) NOT NULL, 
  `User_Email` varchar(50) NOT NULL, 
  `User_DOB` date NOT NULL, 
  `User_Phone` varchar(15) NOT NULL, 
  `User_Addressln1` varchar(50) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `User_Addressln2` varchar(50) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `User_City` varchar(25) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `User_State` varchar(25) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `User_Zip` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `User_Country` varchar(25) DEFAULT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`User_ID`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1 COMMENT='stores user authention 
Info'; 
 
# Data exporting was unselected. 
/*!40101 SET SQL_MODE=@OLD_SQL_MODE */; 
/*!40014 SET FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS=@OLD_FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS */; 
/*!40101 SET CHARACTER_SET_CLIENT=@OLD_CHARACTER_SET_CLIENT 
*/; 
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8  Glossary 
ADFM  Abstracted Digital Forensic Model 
CASE  Computer Aided Software Design 
CFIP  Computer Forensic Investigative Process 
DBA  Database Administrator 
DBMS  Database Management Systems 
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DFRW  Digital Forensics Research Workshop 
DML  Data Manipulation Language 
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IRDS  Information Resource Directory Systems 
ISO  International Standards Organisations 
NIC  Network Interface Card 
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NDFIPM  New Digital Forensic Investigation Procedure Model 
OOBMS  Object Oriented Database Management System 
PSN  Play Station Network 
RAM  Random Access Memory 
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SQL  Structured Query Language 
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XML  Extensible Mark-up Language 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
171 
 
Index 
A 
ACCESS · 15, 16, 17, 20, 26, 27, 33, 34, 42, 43, 44, 46, 
140 
ACQUISITION · 55, 62 
ADMINISTRATOR · 29, 46, 52, 75, 78, 84, 97, 137, 140 
APACHE · 35, 95, 126 
APPLICATION · 23, 27, 28, 30, 38, 41, 47, 81, 83, 91, 94, 97, 
132, 133 
ARBITRARY · 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 139, 140, 141, 142, 
143 
ARP · 87 
ARP CACHE · 87 
ARTIFACTS · 12, 135 
AVAILABILITY · 10, 30, 33, 37, 50, 75, 77, 113, 116, 132 
B 
BACKBONE · 20 
BANKING · 16, 104 
BARRACUDA · 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 129 
BARYAMUREEBA · 57, 62 
BIBLIOFIND · 33 
BINARY DUMP · 73, 112 
BLIND SQL INJECTION · 118 
BOOTKITS · 49 
BRIAN CARRIER · 56, 61 
BRITANNICA · 15 
BUFFER · 26, 40, 43, 44, 139, 141, 142 
C 
CANNED TRANSACTIONS · 17, 18 
CASE · 19, 170 
CASE MANAGEMENT · IV, 117, 138 
CASE OFFICER · 97 
CHALLENGES · 47, 50 
CHROOT · 46 
CLEAN DESK · 123 
CLIENT COMMUNICATION MANAGER · 25, 26 
CLIENT SERVER · 22, 23, 26 
COLD BOOT · 49 
COMMUNICATION · 22, 23, 26, 57, 127 
COMPROMISE · 35, 48, 117, 126 
COMPROMISED · 11, 33, 35, 36, 41, 49, 53, 78, 102, 121, 
122, 124, 125, 128 
COMPUTER-AIDED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING · 19 
CONCEPTUALLY · 51 
CONFIDENTIALITY · IV, 10, 11, 33, 37, 132 
CONTEXT · 43, 54, 117, 136, 137 
CORPORATION · 124, 125, 128, 129 
CREDIT · 79 
CREDIT CARD · 10, 16, 33, 34, 35, 124 
CROSS PLATFORM · 95 
CUSTODIANS · 12 
D 
DATA PROTECTOR BACKUP AGENT · 95 
DATABASE ADMINISTRATOR · 15, 41, 46, 137 
DATABASE ADMINISTRATOR · 16 
DATABASE FORENSICS · 12, 15, 47, 48, 54, 57, 60, 70, 135, 
136, 137, 138 
DB2 · 19, 37, 40, 41, 44, 140 
DBMS · 15, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 45, 142 
DEAD · 81, 84, 86, 119, 125 
DEFINITIONS · 53 
DELETED · 32, 50, 74, 113, 115 
DEPLOYMENT · 56, 62, 133, 138 
DIGITAL · 32, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 81, 
84, 86, 130, 144, 145, 170 
DISKS · 23 
DISTRIBUTED · 10, 20, 22, 23, 24, 39 
DIVERSE · 55 
DOWNTIME · 76, 78, 115 
DROP DOWN LIST · 101, 105 
DUAL · 95 
DUTCH · 11 
DYNAMITE · 58 
E 
ENCASE · 32 
ENCRYPTED · 41, 73, 74, 113 
ENCYCLOPEDIA · 15, 51 
ENGINEERING · 65, 144 
ENTITY-RELATIONSHIP (ER) MODEL · 19 
ESSENTIAL · I, 10, 15, 20, 132 
EUGENE · 56, 61 
EVIDENCE · IV, V, 11, 20, 31, 32, 48, 51, 52, 55, 57, 58, 59, 
60, 61, 68, 71, 81, 85, 86, 87, 89, 109, 117, 119, 122, 
125, 126, 127, 132, 138 
EVIL MAID · 49 
EXPLOITATION · IV, 11  
 
172 
 
EXPLOITING · 49 
F 
FINANCE · 104 
FIREFOX · 95 
FLORENCE · 57 
FLUX · 51 
FOOLPROOF · 138 
FORENSIC · II, 15, 47 
FORENSIC EXAMINERS · 73, 74, 112, 113, 118, 119, 124, 
125, 128, 129 
FORTUNE 500 · 19 
FRAMEWORK · II 
FRAMEWORKS · 12, 13, 55, 68, 69, 90, 132, 135, 136, 137 
FUNCTIONAL · 75, 76, 87, 114, 116 
G 
GENE SPAFFORD · 35 
H 
HASHED · 41, 118, 121 
HEIDI · 95 
HIGH-LEVEL · 14, 17, 136 
HOSPITAL RECORD MANAGEMENT · 104 
HOT SPARE · 95 
HP · 95 
HUMAN RESOURCE · 104 
HYPERVISOR · 49 
I 
INDIA · 65 
INFORMATION RESOURCE DIRECTORY SYSTEM · 19 
INTEGRITY · IV, 10, 11, 29, 50, 59, 132 
INTEGRITY · 29, 33, 37 
INTERNET EXPLORER · 95 
INTEROPERABILITY · 24 
IRDS · 19, 170 
ISO 27001/17799 · 123 
J 
JDBC · 26, 40 
K 
KERNEL · 87 
L 
LEGAL · 50 
LIFE SUPPORT · 104 
LITCHFIELD · 15, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 52, 145 
LITERATURE · IV, 15, 53, 54, 74, 113, 135, 137 
LIVE · 81, 84, 86, 119, 121, 125 
LOAD BALANCER · 118 
LOCKS · 104 
M 
MACINTOSH · 32 
MEMORY · 23, 26, 29, 49, 50, 51, 52, 73, 95, 112 
MEMORY · 87 
MICROSOFT SQL SERVER · 37 
MONOLITHIC · 20, 21 
MULTI-DATABASE · 24 
MULTIPLE-CORE · 95 
MYSQL · 37, 38, 42, 45, 46, 47, 91, 95, 102, 121, 140, 
143 
N 
NATO · 35 
NAVICAT · 95 
NMAP · 138 
NON-CRITICAL DATABASE · 104 
NON-TECHNICAL · 55 
NORTHERN · 65 
O 
OBSOLETE · 126, 128 
ODBC · 26 
ONE-HALF CENT · 31 
ONSET · 90, 137 
ORACLE · 42 
ORACLE · 15, 19, 20, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 
139, 140, 142 
OUTBOUND · 123, 128  
 
173 
 
P 
PARALLEL · 21, 23, 24 
PATCHES · 126, 128 
PEER-TO-PEER · 23 
PERL · 95, 133 
PERTAINING · 35, 98, 119 
PETCO · 34 
PHYSICAL · 81, 84, 85 
PLAYBOY · 33 
POLICY · 81, 89, 110, 122, 123, 128 
POLLITT · 55 
PORTABILITY · 70 
POSTGRESQL · 37, 38, 46, 102, 142 
POWER GRID · 104 
PRIVILEGES · 42, 44, 46, 52, 82, 83, 121, 123, 140, 142, 
143 
PROBLEM · 38, 40, 41, 43 
PROCEDURES · V, 44, 45, 51, 53, 81, 83, 117, 138, 142 
PROGRAMMERS · 18 
Q 
QRIOCITY · 124 
QUALITATIVE · IV, 12, 137 
QUALITATIVE · 111 
QUANTITATIVE · 117 
R 
RAID · 95 
RDBMS · 19 
RELATIONAL · 19, 25, 26, 87, 170 
REPORT GENERATION · 75, 114 
RESEARCH · II, 15 
RESTRAIN · 70 
RETAILER · 33, 34 
ROOT · 46, 48, 143 
ROOTKIT · 48, 49 
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE · 31 
RSA · 35 
RUSSIAN · 33 
S 
SALTING · 118 
SCENARIOS · 90, 117, 137 
SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINE · 31, 32 
SCIENTIFICALLY · 55 
SEIZING · 85 
SERVER · 15, 19, 22, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 139, 
140, 141, 142, 143 
SHIELDING · 57, 65, 69 
SLAMMER WORM · 38, 40 
SONY · 35, 70, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 
SPAFFORD · 56, 57, 61 
STANDARD · 13, 17, 30, 55, 60, 69, 81, 85, 90, 106, 119, 
126, 136, 137, 138 
STRUCTURED QUERY LANGUAGE · 19, 170 
SUPER USER · 75 
SUPPORT · I, 19, 30, 50, 64, 68, 82, 132 
SYBASE · 19, 44, 45 
SYSTEM · 15, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 37, 41, 42, 
45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 53, 56, 59, 71, 75, 80, 81, 82, 87, 
135 
SYSTEMATICALLY · V, 11, 117, 125, 138 
T 
TAMPERING · 20, 34, 78 
TECHNICAL · 12, 28, 37, 53, 55, 64, 70, 81, 88, 94, 108, 
122, 127 
TECHNOLOGICAL · 90, 137 
TEMPORAL · 87 
TESTING · 68, 104, 132, 133 
THEORETICAL · 53, 135 
THIRD PARTY · 34, 56, 69, 71, 125, 132 
TOOLS · 11, 18, 48 
TRACEBACK · 58 
TRANSACTION · 22, 26, 51, 52, 53 
TRANSACTIONAL STORAGE MANAGER · 25, 26 
TRIGGING · 125 
TUSHABE · 57, 62 
U 
U.S INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE · 31 
UKRAINIAN · 33 
UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLY · 95 
UNPRIVILEGED · 46 
V 
VENANSIUS · 57 
VISUAL · 94  
 
174 
 
W 
WEBSERVER · 26, 95 
WORKFLOW · 70 
WORLD · 10, 46, 138, 143 
X 
XAMPP · 95 
XTREE GOLD · 32 
 
 
 